

**SECURING FAILED INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES
THE MILITARY'S ROLE**

**A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree**

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SECURING FAILED INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES: THE MILITARY'S ROLE by MAJ
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This study examines the threat to internal security posed by violent gangs. This threat was found to be particularly acute in inner-city communities that have over time devolved to a status that the author classified as failed communities. Armed gangs had a very negative impact on the communities which housed them, resulting in a subculture regulated by gang rule. Civil authorities were found to be in breach of the social contract which required that, in return for the loyalty of citizens, they would provide that important social good--security--in accordance with the general will of the citizens.

A literature survey identified indications of the failure of law enforcement agencies in the inner city. The security needs of inner-city residents were not accorded significant priority under the strategy of containment which was practiced. This made the police highly irrelevant for the security needs of residents caught up in the midst of the crisis. Analyzing the causes for the failures revealed weaknesses with the traditional assumptions behind national and internal security policy formulation. Correcting the faulty basic assumption of a uniformly stable internal environment was suggested as an important step for the recognition of the gravity of the inner-city dilemma.

Military officers, as the professionals in the management of violence, were considered more competent for the application of force than peace officers equipped with military type capabilities. Accordingly the military was considered a feasible, acceptable, and suitable partner for a multiagency social and security intervention that had as its strategic purpose the retaking of control of failed communities from armed gangs and the restoration of the rule of law. The military was considered an unsuitable partner in a strategy seeking to contain the spread of violence and crime to new areas.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	17
III. MILITARY FORCE AS OPTION FOR COMBATING GANGS	55
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF USING MILITARY FORCE.....	78
V. CONCLUSION.....	104
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	114
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	119

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Inner-City Dilemma

Gang warfare within inner-city communities of large urban centers has served to further scar the image of the already socially *marginalized* ghetto. In the worst affected areas, residents who cannot afford to relocate have very few options for survival and the pretenses of liberty and democracy--the trademarks of a civilized society--have all but lost credibility. The preponderance of heavily armed gangs and the fierce territorial rivalry between them have added to the plague of poverty and squalor, making some inner-city areas into virtual war zones. Armed criminal gangs have raised the threat of physical violence and intimidation, debasing the quality of life and dashing the hope of renewal within urban slums. There is an urgent need to combat gang violence, in order to protect inner-city residents from the ever-present threat of violence. This study examines the inner-city security problem, the feasibility of employing military force as part of the solution, and the implications of using military force.

Western society has exhibited tolerance of very broad disparities in life chances across social classes, as well as racial and ethnic groupings within its population. There has been a preferred tendency to take human nature as it comes, with emphasis on assuring and preserving individual freedoms and responsibilities while holding state intervention to a minimum. The tendency is to rely on the working of invisible hands, not of an unseen God, but rather of a free market, to do the sorting, sifting and regulating by "the competitive pursuit of self interest."¹ This manner of thinking leads society to hold individuals fully responsible for their station in

life. By blaming the poor for their poverty, the rest of society is able to avoid any share in the ownership of the problem. Such societies therefore tolerate the existence of the inner city with all its squalor. However, to blame victims of inner-city violence for their demise, is neither socially nor politically acceptable. There is the liberal view that self-limiting processes may in the long run help to control the violence. Mark Moore argued that:

It is possible that the pool of those "susceptible" to the allure of violence will dry up--that youths inclined in this direction will end up dead or in prison. [Also] . . . that the concrete experience of seeing children die and attending funerals will begin to change attitudes among children themselves and the community in which they live.²

It is not, however, politically feasible to leave warring gangs to eliminate each other in combat, with the hope that one day will come when the community will no longer be able to stomach the bloodshed. Such an alternative would be far too costly in terms of human life. It is a price society cannot afford for often the victims of gang violence are not the members of rival gangs but innocent bystanders. It is widely acknowledged that breaking the unrelenting spiral of violence, which has depreciated the sanctity of life to unprecedented lows, will require intervention beyond the scope of law enforcement agencies. Civil authorities "will have to act to deal with the pain of the past and with the threat to the future."³ The specific shape and form of what would be a feasible, acceptable, and suitable intervention to resolve the crisis, however, continues to elude civil authorities.

Security options attempted so far include equipping the police with military type of capabilities and initiating efforts to strengthen police and community cooperation. The erosion of civic leadership in the neighborhoods where the needs are the greatest negates the community initiative. The police and community cooperation approach is therefore likely to be a nonstarter in these very critical areas which, in this study, are characterized as failed communities. An intervention by a force significant enough to counter the negative influences and domination of

criminal gangs may create a safety buffer, calm public fears and allow civic-minded people, to begin the process to reconstruct the shattered human and social capital of the failed inner-city communities.

Failure of the state to meet the security needs of neighborhoods in deep crisis may encourage people to seek their own solutions independent of law enforcement. Some gangs already consider themselves to be serving a necessary security function and stake their claim for community support on this basis. Local law enforcement officials, who are trained as peace officers, find themselves overwhelmed when trying to cope with armed gangs. The armed forces on the other hand are the professional managers of violence. They who know how to prosecute a just war against a military foe, but their ignorance and inexperience of civil law, and the very law itself, tend to disqualify them from assisting with law enforcement. There is therefore the problem of preserving the traditional roles of both law enforcement and the armed forces, while focusing the respective strengths of each to secure the democratic way of life.

Political leaders at varying levels have been forced to recognize the growing threat of physical violence and especially the danger of *gangsterism* which is breaking through the confines of the inner city. Regrettably, they may be the last to admit to the limitations of law enforcement. These limitations have been known to gangsters and the residents of the afflicted communities for decades. Halfhearted action by the state to combat murderous destabilizing gangs, amounts to little more than wishful thinking and is therefore of little consequence. Historically when law enforcement has proven incapable of dealing with threat to law and order, the civil authorities have looked to the military for support. In the face of a mounting threat from heavily armed and violent gangs and an apparent incapacity on the part of local law enforcement agencies to routinely maintain law and order, it is reasonable to consider what sort of military support may be rendered.

Military forces have been called on in extraordinary situations, such as riots and insurrections, to aid law enforcement agencies in the protection of life and property and to restore law and order. Violent warring gangsters have distinguished themselves from other gangsters whose primary purpose appears to be more for the social bonding that is present in the group. Their violent nature also distinguishes them from common criminals and rioters. Although their objectives are typically limited, in the sense that they are not about to strike a challenge for state power, the effects of their actions on the local community are more than destabilizing. Despite constraints on the employment of the military for domestic law enforcement, when civil approaches to secure communities against warring gangs fail, the implications of involving the military in the search for a solution has to be explored.

Research Question

The primary question which arises and which this paper will seek to answer is: To what extent may military forces be used to combat criminal gang activity in failed inner-city communities within liberal democracies? It will also be necessary to obtain answers to the following subsidiary questions:

1. What are the major social, political, and economic factors that neutralize existing strategies employed to protect life and property in the inner city?
2. What levels of physical violence, destruction of property--or threats against the same--or threats to public order, freedom, and democracy would constitute an internal threat to security, thereby rendering a domestic military intervention feasible acceptable and suitable?
3. What contributions do gangs make to the communities in which they are based to win legitimacy and support?

4. What is the nature of the constraints placed on the employment of the military in law enforcement? How may these constraints be modified, if necessary to permit military interventions in failed communities?

5. What are the likely missions which could be assigned to military forces and how would these affect the mission essential tasks of units?

6. To what extent would military training, organizational structure, and equipment need to be modified in order to support law enforcement operations?

7. What would be the likely impact on military professionalism and civil-military relations of a military intervention in the inner city?

8. How would success be measured?

Key Definitions

For the purpose of clarification and a common understanding, the meanings applied to the following terms used in this paper are outlined below:

Community Don. This title is commonly used to refer the local community strongman in inner-city areas of Kingston Jamaica. He is the head of the criminal enterprise which involves extortion, drug trafficking, and dealing in firearms as well as regulation of employment on the scarce public works projects in his area. As such he manages the local informal underground economy and the available stock of illegal weapons which circulate within his domain. He often uses violence to eliminate challengers to his status from within his domain, as well as to expand his own span of control and deter any threat to his territory from neighboring communities.

Community Policing. This is a concept of policing that marks a return to the basic functions of a police patrolman on the beat. Police officers are assigned to specific communities and are expected to have close interaction with residents on a wider array of issues than just

responses to crime. The policeman is integrated into the community he or she serves and works with residents to find solutions to the problems of the neighborhood. A number of programs to involve residents in the protection of their communities such as Neighborhood Watch, have evolved to support community policing.

Failed Community. This term is derived from the concept of a failed state. The process of development in a community is considered to have failed when there has occurred an acute breakdown in the rule of law and order, the ethical frame of reference which guides the wider civil society, the social cohesion, and a sense of security and where the resolve of the community to emerge from prolonged crisis is broken. The failed community, although displaying all the features of urban squalor and decay, is characterized more by broken community spirit and a sense of hopelessness, than by broken infrastructures. These communities contain a very high concentration of risk factors and are without the usual counterbalance of protective factors usually provided by family, religion and community organizations.⁴ The presence of criminal gangs that employ destructive physical force, aggravate the impact of other inhibitors to the course of human development. Such gangs are characteristic of failed communities. Some social agencies consider the failed communities irretrievable and so channel their social work elsewhere.⁵

Gang. There is no single acceptable definition for what constitutes a gang. Gangs represent a type of social group with both positive and negative attributes. Some have a formal organizational structure but many do not, being just a collection of neighborhood youth. Some additional characteristics of gangs highlighted by the US Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency fact sheet are: identifiable leadership, identifiable territorial domain, recurrent interaction, and engagement in serious or violent behavior group behavior. Gangs have a culture which gives them identity and fosters a degree of cohesion. They generally

have a primary purpose which narrows their focus and specialty. Many gangs have grown into very dangerous entities which have usurped the authority of the civil police within territories they claim as their turf.⁶

Human Security. This is a concept from the social sciences which expands *basic needs theory* to include broader survival needs. Here more emphasis is placed on the sustainability of the essentials of life and protection against excessive volatility and reversals in living conditions, material, political, social, and cultural. In this regard significant importance is given to the need for personal security and freedom from violence.⁷

Inner City. This term is a softer expression for the urban ghetto. It refers to urban commercial and dwelling areas which characteristically suffer from high levels of poverty, unemployment, poor housing and sanitation, and dysfunctional civil administration. There is typically outward migration of the more progressive members of the community, thereby depleting the cadre of potential civic leaders and leaving behind communities of *marginalized* people. While these characteristics are generally true, the degree of *ghettoization* varies from community to community. The majority of inner-city areas have not yet reached the level of decay to be given the status of a failed community.

Insurgency. "The existence of an armed expression of internal, organic political disaffection within a state."⁸

Internal Security. This refers to the protection of the state from internal threats to its stability. The emphasis in democratic societies has been on protecting institutions of the state and public and civilian property. It involves action to suppress revolts and riots which threaten public order and safety. Law enforcement agencies are generally charged with the responsibility for internal security, with the military rendering assistance in times of extreme threats.

Legitimacy. "The conceded right to exercise authority over and on behalf of a population. . . . [This implies] the perceived ability to understand and properly meet the hopes, fears, needs and aspirations of a population or major constituency of a population."⁹

Militarism. This refers to the involvement of the military in the affairs of civil society, particularly in the political process. In the extreme cases militarism may mean the exercise of direct political power by a military government. In other instances militarism may refer to the practice of using military force by unpopular governments to suppress political opposition. Also included in the term militarism is any indirect influence, exercised by military forces over civil government. The term generally carries negative connotations reflecting opposition to military interference in civil affairs. In liberal democracies, militarism has been effectively controlled by the well-established principle of civilian control over the military.¹⁰

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). This term is used in the United Kingdom and throughout the British Commonwealth. It refers to the use of service personnel, armed or not, to maintain public order and to counteract terrorist activity. MACP would relate most closely to the category of US military domestic support operations labeled: Support to Civilian Law Enforcement.¹¹ The primary legal basis for MACP is not statute law but Common Law. The manual of military law which applies to the services in both the United Kingdom and Jamaica states thus:

The common law, which governs soldiers and citizens alike imposes two main obligations in such cases, which are , first that every citizen is bound to come to the aid of the civil power when the civil power requires his assistance to enforce law and order, and, secondly, that to enforce law and order no one is allowed to use more force than is necessary.¹²

Political Violence. This is characterized by a variety of complex criteria presupposing actions that have political meaning ranging from brief street demonstrations to armed conflict seeking the overthrow of an existing regime. Acts of violence or intimidation are typically used

to promote support for a particular political ideology or grouping within limited geographic zones. The agents of political violence are usually known to the persons whose freedoms are suppressed; however, the effective control of power is used to protect the agents of political violence from the law. "Political violence generally reflects a decrease in political order."¹³

Social Capital. This refers to features of social organization, such as networks, commonly accepted norms, and trust which facilitate coordination and cooperation of mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investments in physical and human capital, which would otherwise go untapped or not be used to its full potential.

Part of the problem facing [residents] in the inner-city is that they lack "connections" in the most literal sense. Job seekers in the ghetto have little access, for example, to conventional job referral networks. . . . [T]he [youth] unfortunate enough to live in a neighborhood whose social capital has eroded is more likely to end up hooked, booked, or dead. . . . Where you live and whom you know--the social capital you can draw on--helps to define who you are and thus determine your fate.¹⁴

Terrorism. This is defined as "the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience."¹⁵

Scope of Study

This study explored the security dilemma of the typical inner-city environment found in large urban centers of democratic states. Reference was restricted in the main to specific scenarios in the US, the United Kingdom, and Jamaica, although the problem of insecurity in urban centers is far more pervasive. The availability of data and expertise on the American and British experiences and the researcher's direct observations and familiarity with Jamaica make these natural choices for areas of emphasis.

The United States--the most powerful nation on earth--has a growing number of inner-city communities where the police have lost control of the streets to gangs. Military force has

been used in the US to put down riots, revolts, and rebellions, but the more routine support to law enforcement has been out of practice for many decades. In the meantime some communities have become dominated by the influence of violent armed gangs.

The United Kingdom provides a model of an industrialized country that has deployed and maintained military units in Military Aid to the Civil Power (in its Northern Ireland Province) for over two decades. Although it has not employed its military on home soil in a general public order role since 1926,¹⁶ the UK presently faces a growing threat on the mainland from terrorists and highly publicized drug-trading gangs labeled as *Yardies*.

Jamaica, an independent developing nation with strong economic and military ties with both the US and the UK, has an international reputation as an *island paradise*. Its military doctrine has been copied from the British, but is also being influenced through increasing exposure to US military education and training. Gang violence, although confined to a few sections of the capital city Kingston, has threatened the island's international reputation as a tranquil tourist resort. The local police have sought and obtained the aid of Jamaica's military to maintain law and order in the troubled areas. Linkages between criminal gangs in Jamaica, the US, and the UK have encouraged cooperation between law enforcement agencies in these countries.¹⁷

This paper did not set out to establish generalizations for all internal security threat scenarios but focused instead on the threat posed by armed criminal gangs. It was necessary, however, to review military involvement in quelling riots and other public disorders. While being cognizant of the fact that the question of security could not be pursued in isolation from the larger issues of human development, the scope of the paper did not permit for a full integration of the development issues with those of security. However, reference is made to the

social component of the problem and the necessity to include social action in any proposed intervention. Security is treated as a basic human need and a prerequisite for development.

Significance of Study for Public Safety

Fear of crime and vulnerability to physical violence are major issues of concern for residents of urban centers all over the world. A nation's armed forces may allow the national population to feel protected from foreign aggression, but local law enforcement organizations have generally been far less successful in maintaining law and order, particularly in urban centers. The focus throughout is on inner-city communities most prone to violence, where conflict between rival gangs has transformed the already socially depressed areas into virtual *combat zones*. An attempt was made to raise the significance of internal security in the overall consideration of national security policy formulation. The analyses may be of interest primarily to persons who have a stake in ensuring the safety of residents in communities most prone to violence.

Elected officials, law enforcement officers, and military personnel may take an interest in this study since it analyzes an option for combating violent gangs, which is already being practiced in some countries and may someday have to be exercised by others. Military forces are being engaged more and more in operations other than war. It may not be very long before the political will is found to commit the military at home to protect the local population from gunmen grouped in gangs. Some of the implications of such military employment are explored in this thesis.

The military forces of several developing countries which lack the capability to wage war against their neighbors have already been oriented towards the question of internal security. The trend has generally been conservative, with the military being used as an instrument of last

resort to supplement law enforcement. This study will allow for some lessons to be drawn from such military operations and should therefore have some relevance for countries whose military forces are already familiar with aiding law enforcement.

Research Methodology

A literary survey of secondary data collected through library research was employed to explore the topic. The secondary sources themselves reflect many years of work by researchers in the relevant subject areas of inner-city crises, gang behavior, internal security, military operations other than war, military operations in support of domestic law enforcement agencies, and so on. While the examination of theoretical concepts and principles of operation will be kept broad in scope, the basic unit of study was the local community.

The local community is considered to be the most suitable level at which to begin to plan for social interventions. Below the community is the family unit, and no intrusion into the family is to be contemplated. It is at the level of a local community that it first becomes possible to identify geographic zones and concentrations of population that display exceptionally high levels of internal violence. The local community is therefore the most basic level of organization at which a state is likely to stage an intervention to combat violence and fulfill its obligation to provide protection for the population. It is also at this level of the local community that an appreciation for the tactical problem is best obtained. Finding an approach to eliminating the threat posed by violent criminal gangs has to begin with an analysis of the local communities within which they operate.

Chapter 2 describes and analyzes the social, political, and economic life of the inner city and seeks to justify the designation of the worst affected areas as *failed communities*. The analyses were qualitative in nature and employed elements of evaluation research, comparing the

aim of policy with the result of policy. Accounts from the literature depict the general characteristics common to most inner-city communities--unemployment, poverty, squalor, deprivation and *broken windows*. The impact of dangerous gangs which speeds up decline and the features of the inner-city subculture formed over time are also reviewed. The factors contributing to and sustaining the breakdown of the rule of law, the plague of violence, the loss of civil liberties, the high levels of fear in the local population, and the pervading sense of hopelessness, are analyzed, to determine the causes for the failure of traditional security strategies.

A detailed analysis of the military option for countering the threat of violence commences in chapter 3. In seeking an answer to questions relating to the level of threat that would precipitate domestic military intervention, lessons from history were applied to the threat environment of the failed community. Constraints on the use of force from the legal standpoint and from the basis of common practice were identified. So too were current trends and attitudes toward military involvement in operations other than war, which may weigh on the political decision to intervene militarily.

Elements of operational art were applied to the security dilemma to identify the interests which were at risk. The identification of possible strategic and operational objectives, centers of gravity, decisive points and culminating points, aided the analysis. A strategic and operational concept for inner-city intervention are outlined along with clear military objectives and definitions for success. The mission essential tasks associated with an inner-city intervention are also identified in chapter 3.

The general implications of military involvement in support of domestic law enforcement are discussed in chapter 4. The practical experiences of military forces which have been employed in similar functions were utilized for the analysis. Military competencies were

matched against the threat environment and compared with civil law enforcement. They were evaluated for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability.

The feasibility measure evaluated the contribution the military could reasonably be expected to make given the context, the strategic objectives and the constraints on the use of force. The contribution would be considered feasible if it had a reasonable chance of success. Acceptability was evaluated based on the attitudes of the various stake holders toward military involvement to protect lives and property in the domestic environment. These attitudes were balanced against stake holders tolerance for the conditions of the inner city. Some of the specific concerns of stake holders included the risk to military professionalism, danger to security personnel and threats to civil liberties and the civil military relationships. It was necessary to make assumptions concerning the likely community response to a redefined security strategy. The actual sentiments of the residents of affected communities could not be gleaned through a literary survey. Their perspective on a military approach would have added greater validity to the findings. Intervention would be considered acceptable if costs could be mitigated by other factors and the benefits of intervention.

The measure of suitability was closely linked to those for feasibility and acceptability. The competencies of the military and civil law enforcement agencies were weighed in light of the threat environment. A suitable evaluation would rest on an the ability to cast the security problem as a military problem and one which required military capabilities for resolution. The issue of suitability would only arise if the military option was both feasible and acceptable.

The limited time available for this project did not allow for fieldwork, such as direct observation of the sort of communities which were the subject of this study. In lieu of this fieldwork, the researcher sought to find the closest approximations possible within existing literature and to apply personal observations made prior to the start of this specific project.

There was also insufficient time to deal extensively with the broader issue of human development within the inner city, even though this is considered a critical part of any intervention in the inner city. In the end, however, the methodology followed did allow for answers to be found to the research questions.

Quantitative data were not considered particularly suitable for this study, because of the lack of data on crimes directly attributable to gangs at the level of the community. Not all crimes are to be treated with the same degree of alarm. Of gravest concern are those which involve violence against the person, resulting in injury or death. Threat to use violence in this way may severely curtail the liberty of individuals but are seldom reported and therefore most often absent from crime data. Crime data do, however, provide an indication of the police departments which face the most daunting tasks and the counties where political authorities will be hardest pressed to find solutions. In essence they may help to identify the general locations of our failed communities--the likely areas of operations.

¹James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, Crime & Human Nature (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 528.

²Mark Moore, "The Epidemic of Youth Violence," Jobs & Capital 4 (Winter 1995): 3.

³Ibid.

⁴Robert Halpern, Rebuilding the Inner City: A History of Neighborhood Initiatives to Address Poverty in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 200.

⁵Ibid., 202.

⁶For a spectrum of popular viewpoints on gangs see Charles Cozic, ed., Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1996).

⁷For an exposition on this subject see Manfred Max-Neef et al., "Human Scale Development," Development Dialogue 1 (Uppsala, Sweden, 1989), 5-80.

⁸Larry Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog," in CGSC C520 Syllabus, Military Operations Other Than War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 79.

⁹Ibid., 80. This definition is preferred although it varies slightly from that of US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 13-4. It allows consideration of legitimacy for organizations like gangs which, having no legal right to exercise authority, still seek to win the willing acceptance of the public.

¹⁰For a detailed discourse on militarism consult works by John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), and Karl Liebknecht, Militarism (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1917).

¹¹US Army, FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 3-1.

¹²Manual of Military Law, part II, sec. v (2) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969).

¹³Sam Sarkesian, "African Military Regimes : Institutionalized Instability or Coercive Development," ed. Sheldon Simon, The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts (Boulder, CO: West View Press, 1978), 15.

¹⁴Robert Putman, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," The American Prospect 13 (Spring 1993), 9. (<http://epn.org/prospect/13/13putn.html>).

¹⁵Source Book of Criminal Justice Statistics. 20th Anniversary Ed. (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, 1992), 418.

¹⁶Mathew Midlane, "Military Aid to the Civil Power," in Sword and Mace, ed. John Sweetman (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 125.

¹⁷Jamaican gangsters maintain criminal links with counterparts in the US and the UK. During the middle 1980s gangs in the US recruited members from Jamaica and provided a ready source of illegal firearms to gangsters in Jamaica. Jamaican gangs which were involved in the marijuana trade were absorbed into the crack trade. The term *Yardie* in the UK context is said to refer to the origin of gangsters from Yard (in Jamaica). Cooperation between law enforcement agencies of the three countries include the sharing of information and intelligence, the tracing of firearms to their sources of origin, and counternarcotics training.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Criminal Gangs as a Threat to Security

There can be little opposition to the view that violent gangs, with a primary criminal purpose, pose a significant threat to the security of inner-city communities. Indeed, the proliferation of gangs and their emergence in suburbs, beyond the boundaries of traditional high-crime areas, constitute a threat to the security and stability of a growing number of communities.¹ The question arises as to whether or not inter- and intra-communal strife, which results in criminal gangs fighting each other over turf, spoils, or supremacy, has any less significant impact on the lives of innocent residents in the local domestic environment, than do conflicts taking place in the many corners of the globe? How can a nation claim to be secure when, although suppressing or deterring regional conflicts in distant lands, gangsters at home are not curtailed from raping, pillaging, inflicting injury, and murdering, often innocent folks, in many local inner-city communities?²

It is difficult to draw clear distinctions between the different kinds of internal threats to security and stability. The immediacy of the threat posed by a rioting mob is easy to appreciate and will elicit a fairly swift response. On the other hand, the destabilizing force of violence waged by criminal gangs, though very real, is often downplayed or denied during the early stages of development of the crisis and is only acknowledged after members of the elite are affected. Again, acts of terror which claim the lives of persons in mainstream society become highly

visible and are branded as terrorism, while the continuing terror which causes whole communities to be gripped by fear is simply regarded as a serious crime problem.

Deciding when to erase the thin separating line between serious crimes of violence and violence intended to intimidate whole communities and coerce segments of a population to adopt a particular course of action which amounts to terrorism is important, for it affects the sorts of responses which may be permissible under law (a question of legality) and those which would be tolerated by the citizens of a liberal democracy (a question of legitimacy). Maintaining a focus on the aim of security--the protection of the people--and being reinforced by a realistic appreciation of the resources necessary to provide for that security, should prove more useful to the political authorities than the narrow definitions of a crisis which might constrain the security options. In the case of Northern Ireland, it was politically expedient to label the crisis as a serious crime problem, so that the perpetrators of the violence could be treated as common criminals and not political prisoners if and when they were caught. Tom Baldy asserted that "the criminalization assumption [was] wrong" and that "there [was] more than a serious crime complicated by sectarian violence."³

Relegating the widespread occurrence of crimes of violence to second order internal threats may be bordering on political irresponsibility, when the threat has escalated to levels that may hurt a national economy⁴ or that would lead the US Attorney General Janet Reno to declare:

Everyday, crime shatters peace in our Nation's neighborhoods, violent crime and the fear it engenders cripple our society, threaten personal freedom, and fray the ties that are essential for healthy communities. No corner of America is safe from increasing levels of criminal violence.⁵

The Impact of Gangs on the Social Climate

While criminal violence may threaten the whole population of a country, the problem is most severe in the impoverished urban communities defined in this study as failed inner-city

communities⁶ where armed gangs have established a foothold. To understand the threat facing residents of failed inner-city communities, a brief appreciation of the cultural, social, political, and economic environment within which inner-city residents subsist and gangs persist is essential. Whether called inner city, ghetto, or slum, social decay is a common feature of these segregated communities, set apart from mainstream society and reserved for habitation by minority classes.⁷ Robert Halpern (1995) links the segregation and isolation of the inner city to its eventual demise. He cites

a pattern of decisions by outside public and private institutions not to invest in, insure, support, or interact with those neighborhoods or their residents. These decisions in turn have heightened the vulnerability and isolation of inner-city neighborhoods, contributing to a deterioration in the social fabric, thinner associational networks, fewer social institutional resources, and a growing sense of anger and betrayal.⁸

In their study of the social context of crime prone neighborhoods, Wilson and Hernstein (1985) focused on three specific features: the influence of peers and gangs, the social boundaries, and the density of criminal targets and social surveillance. Their findings revealed evidence that peers and gangs influenced the value placed on committing crimes, while the social boundaries tended to work in the opposite direction, that is to influence the value of not committing crime. The density of targets affected the time between a given moment and the opportunity for committing crimes, and community surveillance was found to influence the risk of being caught.⁹

Gangs have emerged as the principal social group to survive the *ghettoization* of the urban community, scoring better than the family unit and the church. As such, they fill a social void for many thousands of inner-city youth: "With mothers disabled and fathers jailed, and the important economic opportunities centered on the drug trade, gangs became even more powerful."¹⁰ Gangs have helped to reshape the subculture of the inner city--its idioms, music, graphic art, and the nature of relationships between the people suffering together within them.

Wolfgang and Ferracuti, whose work is cited by Wilson and Hernnstein, found that there existed a subculture of violence, that leads persons raised in it to resort to assault and murder more frequently than do persons raised in different subcultures.¹¹ The fact that this subculture of violence exists in many inner-city areas is not in doubt. In the words of Javier Rodriguez, who had lost his son at the hands of a gang, "make no mistake [the] community has been invaded by a culture of death and terror; it is thriving."¹² The popular music of the American inner city known as *Gangsta Rap* goes beyond the regular bounds of entertainment to promote violence. This music has been described as "a social time bomb in our midst."¹³ Billboard Magazine was also critical of *Gangsta Rap* stating that it "leads to death of conscience, the corruption of the spirit, and ultimately the destruction of the individual and the community."¹⁴

As inner-city youth struggle to come to grips with the reality of their lives, facing alienation from mainstream society on the outside, they find ready accommodation in neighborhood gangs. The factors which attract youth to gangs were found by Fredrick Trasher to be especially strong in inner-city areas. These factors included "broken or poor families, deteriorating neighborhoods, thrill seeking, and admiration of older gang members."¹⁵ Among neighborhood gang types are to be found some in which members come together primarily for the sense of affiliation and belonging they foster.¹⁶ Gangs which focus on economic crimes such as burglary, robberies, and extortion, also employ violence, but are generally less threatening than drug gangs. The youth of the inner-city come to value crime, and according to Wilson and Hernnstein, in a community where there were few legitimate opportunities for work, delinquents would organize themselves in fighting gangs in which the principal rewards were safety and reputation.¹⁷

With the trend towards greater alienation, the slum becomes more and more "the only relevant job market."¹⁸ Residents deprived of reliable information about good jobs lose hope of

finding a decent job and grow skeptical and pessimistic about the value of advancement. Guns and drugs emerged in the late 1980s and continued into the 1990s as the principal features of the inner-city economy. The introduction of these two evils changed the coercive power of gangs from what it used to be in earlier decades when, according to Delk (1995), "a typical gang rumble would involve bats, sticks, chains and knives. Guns were often present, but not routinely used. Now there are literally thousands of firearms scattered among the gangs."¹⁹

The gun has become the primary tool, drugs the primary commodity, and violence a frequently used medium of exchange in the underground economy managed by community Dons. "Murders are committed in order to realize the gang's goals of increasing profits, controlling renegade members, protecting existing territories and markets, and terrorizing competitors."²⁰ Both the guns and drugs are controlled by gangs and both have left their stamp on the inner-city subculture.

It is general knowledge that inner-city violence got worse with the rise in narcotics trafficking, one of the primary occupations available in the inner city.²¹ O'Kane is of the view that gangs graduate "from burglary, mugging, thieving, assault, rape, murder and so on [to enter] . . . the more rational worlds of organized gang activity."²² It would, however, appear that the vast majority have difficulty attaining the higher levels as crimes of violence against persons remain high. The narcotics trade is nonetheless organized and is described as harsh and dangerous: "Warlords appear, gain notoriety, and are quickly gunned down; new leaders appear and a new cycle of internecine violence begins with drug dealers competing for prominence in a criminal realm without any clear codes of behavior."²³ This type of feuding has become a notable feature of many metropolitan centers.

Drug gangs use violence to obtain and maintain the most lucrative markets, to maintain discipline among the peddlers, to enforce collections, and to eliminate competitors. The income

from the trade is concentrated at the highest echelons, with only the required amounts to curry the favor of the community being distributed. The individual rewards are sufficiently lucrative to attract new recruits to the gangs. The real net impact of the drug trade on the welfare of the community is, however, negative, since the overall wealth of the community has not improved, while the life span of those involved as workers and clients as well as innocent youth have been diminished. It is this category of gangs that benefit the most from the status quo, that will offer the fiercest resistance to any security operation to unseat them.

One effect of gang feuding has been the dissection and *territorialization* of the inner city into small enclaves run by rival gangs, each with its own leader or Don as they are sometimes called. According to O'Kane the aim of these gangs which have a primary criminal purpose

rests in consolidating their own power. . . . This entails the elimination and neutralization of . . . competitors. . . . [T]he violence often appears incomprehensible to both police and public alike. Competitors are executed in bizarre ways and often times family members and innocent bystanders are similarly murdered. . . . [T]his viciousness is a planned terror calculated to intimidate . . . rivals. It serves notice to the local community and competing criminals . . . hat no opposition will be accepted.²⁴

Territorialization makes the isolation of the inner-city even more acute as it alienates inner-city communities from each other. The little social capital that had accumulated in earlier decades of combined struggle for social justice has quickly depreciated. Instead of the community being an entity that "transcends space . . . [to include] all social bonds and groupings that bring people together,"²⁵ the gang-infested community emphasizes its geographic boundaries and is characterized by hostile rivalry with its neighbors. These little enclaves become no go areas for nonresidents and in the more volatile areas even the police may be viewed as trespassers and are in significant peril.

Although gangs generally do not openly challenge the national political system, at the level of the local community they maintain effective informal control over residents and the

limited resources of the community. Developments within a community revolve around the important questions as to "who the power holders are, the sources of their power, [and] the values and interests that are served by the exercise of power."²⁶ The influence of violent gangs extends beyond the bounds of the local community. Gangs subvert the legal process by the intimidation of witnesses in what has been described as "the essence of conspiracy"²⁷ in order to effectively escape conviction. The few who are sentenced to prison terms also assume positions of informal authority over prisoners. Concern over the informal power and influence of gangs was expressed by James Jacob: "The rise of . . . quasi political gangs that can determine the safety of young men both on the streets and in prison will probably affect criminal activity of those boys (and grown men) who elect out of greed fear or whatever to join."²⁸

The indications from failed inner-city communities are that the negative influence of violent gangs and the perceived value of crime are overpowering. To complicate the issue of value placed on crime, there was also evidence that some gang violence was being practiced without regard for any immediate material gain. This was described as "the aspect of modern gangs that most clearly distinguishes them from the street gangs of 1920s and 1930s."²⁹ It may also be deduced that the inner city offers very little perceived rewards for obeying the civil law, that the opportunities to break the law without the risk of penalty are aplenty and that the community surveillance system is an ineffective deterrent. It is very likely that the surveillance system operates rather to protect law breakers from law enforcers. These forces operate together to make the inner city a very dangerous place to live.

The Gang as a Security Entity

For the inner-city youth born and raised in a culture of violence, the neighborhood gang must be viewed as much more than a criminal enterprise. Some researches like Felix Padilla and

James Diego Vigil, who are cited in Cozic (1996), suggest that joining a gang is:

often a conditioned response to the experience of growing up in inner-cities. . . . [It] is a predictable consequence . . . for youths surrounded by unemployment and poverty, an entrenched gang subculture (including friends or relatives who are current or former gang members), and dangerous levels of crime and violence.³⁰

When law enforcement personnel surrender control of the streets and fail to respond to threats against a community, then a void is created which has to be filled. To whom is left the duty to secure the neighborhood? The only ones prepared to defend their stake in the community. In a sense therefore, the gang which was at one stage the source of the problem has become the first line of defense for the community, against the physical threat from external rival gangs. Many residents therefore find some utility in having a gang in the community. A police patrol may make several passes through a community, but having no real attachment to the area, moves on as quickly as it can. The gang stays on the turf and is therefore able to fight off rival intruders.

When residents in affluent neighborhoods feel threatened they take steps to improve their own security. This may include the purchase of a firearm for personal protection, the hiring of private security, or the purchasing of security gadgets.³¹ Youth from the inner city facing an even greater threat of physical violence, also have a high demand for firearms. In the slum "young men carry weapons and join gangs, not simply to prove their manhood or gain a reputation, but also to cope with the problem of safety; much of the life of the gang . . . can be explained as ways of coping with fear and the needs of self defense."³² Many youth "may view gang membership as an inevitable phase or part of life or believe that there are no other options than to join a gang."³³ This account of an eighteen-year-old Chicago gangster was noted in The New York Times:

Around here if you are not in a gang people still think you are still in a gang. You can't walk to school. You can't go where you want, when you want, so you might as well be in a gang.

Then at least when trouble starts, you ain't by yourself. You got some aid and assistance. You got a chance to live. If I didn't have to I wouldn't be in no gang.³⁴

In some inner-city neighborhoods in Kingston, Jamaica, gunmen organize themselves to be able to resist attack. Members of the gangs play a more active role in securing the territory than what would be permitted under the scheme of a neighborhood watch. Under the neighborhood watch arrangement residents would be expected to pass information on wrong doers to the police. In the antiinformant culture of the inner city, this is a high-risk activity. Because rival gangsters are usually indiscriminate in their shootings, all residents from a targeted community are vulnerable and not just those who are active members of the gang. Residents of gang-dominated communities are therefore beholden to the local gangsters, who assume the role of their primary protectors. This protection comes at a high cost for individuals and the whole community.

However, unless the gang in a given community has established its reputation as violent and possessing great coercive strength, it is of no deterrence value. If a community is to have a gang and remain secure from attack from rival gangs, it had better had the most vicious and deadly of the gangs competing for dominance. There is therefore pressure on neighborhood gangs to maintain a tough and ruthless exterior, to constantly recruit new members and to stay current with weaponry.

Deep underneath the callous exterior of every gangster, however, is a heart and a soul. For the most violent these may have become as hard as rock, but for many gang members who joined primarily for affiliation, belonging, and safety, the heart and soul must still be touchable and hence redeemable. Greg Boyle, a Jesuit priest who has had some success working among inner-city youth gangsters, appeals to the wider society to accept youth gangsters as fellow human beings and to treat them with love and compassion. He said that to think of the young

gangsters as monsters would lead society to a strategy for wiping them out, locking them up, and exterminating them. He suggested that thinking of them as human beings would lead to a strategy marked by love, employment, opportunity, school, recreation, care. Instead of countering these youths with force of arms, he suggested a strategy of "confronting [them] with the experience most foreign to them . . . a loving, caring adult."³⁵

Local residents are likely to know the difference between the hard-core murderous gangsters and those who hang on for the pleasures and fashion of *gangsterism*. An intervening force would, however, be at a loss in this regard especially at the outset. The strategy employed by intervening forces should therefore be such that it would cause a natural voluntary separation of the gangsters into the various categories, based on the direct physical threat they pose and the resistance they offer. Those hard-core gangsters who are deeply entrenched, possessing hearts of stone, will be difficult to embrace as suggested by Boyle and may have to be countered with lethal force.

The residents who remain in the inner city deserve a better security arrangement. Policy makers have only a couple strategic options, not all feasible, suitable, or acceptable:

1. Leave armed gangs in charge of the communities they already control but contain the spread of *gangsterism* from reaching to new and more affluent areas.
2. Recapture the communities from the control of gangs and return the task of community protection to law enforcement personnel.

If the authorities decide on the first option then current approaches may continue. The authorities would give the appearance that something is being done while minimizing the risks to the security forces. Local residents would be held accountable for the state of affairs, paying the high price of losing their lives if necessary. Dominant gangsters would retain their status and the underclass would continue to be the ones dying daily from the acute violence. If the second

option better reflects the intent of the authorities, then the state must set the conditions which will permit this transition. It is totally naïve to expect that this can be accomplished without the application of force. It is therefore appropriate to consider the suitability of the military as an instrument of force to facilitate the transition.

Concerns have been raised in international fora over the preoccupation of nations with defense against external threats, while the safety and well being of their local populations remain at risk from internal factors. Inge Kaul, Director, Human Development Report Office of the United Nation Development Programme, expressed the view that the "Rapid and accelerating deterioration in global human security is one of the most critical--if not the most critical--policy challenge today."³⁶ Kaul argued further that: "only few [persons] would consider themselves insecure because of the threat of aggression from neighboring countries . . . many more would have reason to worry about social unrest, political conflict and civil strife within their own country."³⁷

It is reasonable to expect that a national security policy which aims to protect the people, the territory, and the way of life, should respond to threats from both internal and external sources with the same degree of earnestness. Were it to be left to the majority of urban dwellers in crime prone cities to identify the threats to their liberty, safety, and way of life, it is hardly likely that they would raise external concerns. Although their responses would be based on selfish motives, as opposed to national interests, it is useful to note that for many persons, the internal threat is no small matter. This brings into question the responsibility for protecting the civil population from internal threats and specifically how to break the control of dangerous criminal gangs over these communities. The traditional concept of National Security has also to be reviewed.

Responsibility for Protection of the Civil Population

The writings of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Rousseau have guided modern thought on the social contract between citizens and the sovereign of a nation. According to Hobbes: "The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long and no longer than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them."³⁸ He considered a powerful state as a necessity for civil society in which citizens could dwell securely, having their interpersonal relations raised above the *state of nature*.³⁹ As repulsive as the idea of a strong state may be to modern liberal society, domestic security is a *social good* that the market economy is inefficient at delivering and so must be assured by the state.

For Rousseau, who wrote in the eighteenth century, the greatest of all *social goods* were identified as liberty and equality.⁴⁰ By reposing trust in the state for a guarantee of liberty, democracy (if not equality), and security, Rousseau said that an individual loses "natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds at getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses."⁴¹ While every effort is to be made to protect individual liberty, what the *social contract* is committed to protecting is the general will, not the *will of all*, and certainly not the will of the individual when individual self-interest is inimical to the general good. Civil liberty demands civil responsibility, thus the conduct of citizens in liberal society is regulated by the general will embodied in law.

In liberal democracies, lawmakers are chosen from among the people by the majority of the people. The laws identify certain behaviors as abhorrent to the general good and prescribe sanctions to deter them. Deviant acts become evident when there are signs of a law being broken, but a suspect in a free society may only be labeled a criminal after being proven guilty by a competent authority. Where the rule of law breaks down, the civil authority must fulfill its obligation to restore and maintain order in the interest of the general good of all citizens.

Governments must, however, carefully manage the application of force to ensure the preservation of civil rights, freedoms, and the dignity of life to all its people.⁴²

Citizens have tended to place a higher premium on liberty and equality than on security, except in extreme cases where the threat to life is imminent. The high threat scenario facing residents of the failed inner-city community presents such an extreme case, where the instincts of self-preservation are likely to place security concerns very high on the order of priority. The alienation of the inner city from mainstream society, however, has caused suppression of the weight of the interests of inner-city residents by the political clout of the societal mainstream. The deep segregation of society allows the affluent elite segment of the population to remain aloof to much of the plight of the inner city. Thus the pressure which is brought to bear on the authorities is concerned more about preventing the intrusion of *gangsterism* and the drug trade into more affluent neighborhoods than about insecurity within the inner city.

Hobbes stated, "Men naturally seek their own preservation, but being naturally apprehensive of danger from all sources and distrustful of each other, they are driven to seek control and power over others."⁴³ In face of the growing perception of insecurity of urban life people have sought to take measures to enhance their own security. Personal security is no small matter for inner-city residents who are more vulnerable to violence than persons living in affluent neighborhoods:

Personal safety cannot be taken for granted because it is not produced by reciprocal self-restraint or enforced by police agencies. The provincialism of the slum is in part a response to this problem and leads its residents to be preoccupied with those differences among people--chiefly age, sex, ethnicity, territoriality, and reputation--that are useful in discerning who, in their eyes, are more or less likely to be threats to their safety.⁴⁴

Without a strong security role being played by a recognizable entity--preferably the legitimate civil authority--the status of the failed inner city is very likely to approach *survival of the baddest*. Citizens have a right to expect governments to fulfill this function, to prevent

anarchy or gang rule and to assure them security in return for their loyalty. The institution of state assigned the task of enforcing the laws laid down to govern civil society is the constabulary. The individual's right to self-defense and the instinct of self-preservation may not, however, be denied. Therefore, while it is the duty of loyal citizens to obey the law and support the law enforcement agencies, if the civil authorities prove unequal to their obligation under the social contract to protect the citizens, "every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and act for caution against all other men."⁴⁵

Failure to appreciate the magnitude of the gang threat has allowed local political authorities and the rest of civil society to escape ownership of their portion of the problem. The result is that local police units and the residents caught up in the crisis are left alone with the responsibility to protect the community, to make the best of the bad situation. The police have been ineffective in preserving the civil rights, freedoms, and dignity of inner-city residents and are overwhelmed by the task. The initiatives of the residents have likewise failed.

The Concept of National Security

The military forces of a nation are maintained for the primary purpose of acting as an instrument of power to advance the security interests of the state. To the military is given the responsibility for the military security of the state. According to Huntington this responsibility:

leads the military to view the state as the basic unit of political organization. . . . To stress the nature of threats to military security of the state, . . . the immediacy of the threat . . . [and] to oppose the extension of state commitment and involvement in war except where victory is certain.⁴⁶

Modern military forces of the developed world do not generally focus security strategy below the level of the nation state. The focus on external threats developed with the birth of the nation state and the formation of national armies which could threaten unfriendly nations. The defense of the walled city was from then accorded second order priority to defense of the

nation.⁴⁷ This order of priority has generally been observed in principle by all nations which possess military forces. However, in actual practice, many developing countries and emerging democracies, which must resolve internal conflicts in the search for national unity and identity, have had to give priority security interest to internal security concerns.

The employment of the military for domestic security is not, however, a phenomenon of the developing world only. Each nation employs its military forces to safeguard from attack, those security interests which are considered important. There are often internal domestic threats to security that can only be countered by the application of military force. Even in developed societies with age-old democracies, domestic threats may be "as daunting as any potential threat to national security."⁴⁸ This view was shared by a former US Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson, who in reference to the urban problem in America, said that it threatens "long term security more than the traditional preoccupations of security."⁴⁹

Diversity within national populations in such areas as religious preferences, ethnicity, race, and class and the exclusion of specific groups from mainstream society have often been at the root of internal conflicts throughout the twentieth century.⁵⁰ Assumptions of a stable and secure domestic environment upon which an outwardly focused security strategy is predicated may therefore not always be valid. Internal conflicts can simmer for extended periods before rising to the surface. When they do, they can threaten not only internal stability, but also the very survivability of the state.⁵¹ Security policy makers should therefore be careful not to make invalid assumptions concerning the sufficiency domestic security. They must instead make adequate provisions to counter these threats.

Huntington saw no reason why nation-states should be the only sociopolitical groups maintaining professional forces although that was the case, "save for a few peripheral exceptions."⁵² It is conceivable that professional military forces could be retained for security

interests below the level of the nation-state, provided their political objectives were localized so as not to come in conflict with national objectives. There have been instances throughout history of both professional and militia type forces being engaged in domestic security operations.⁵³

Brehm and Gray regard the Army as “the ultimate social agency . . . responsible for the most basic welfare, and security of the citizenry.”⁵⁴

Whenever the security of the people is threatened, the state is expected to use instruments of power at its disposal to protect them. Huntington advises that security has become “the final goal of policy rather than the starting assumption.”⁵⁵ The utility of a concept of national security that neglected the protection of the local population from internal threats while those threats were mounting would be questionable. It would appear to be a reasonable proposition for the military forces of a nation-state to be accessible to protect local communities within the state, that face threats from internal sources which prove to be too severe for local law enforcement.

Internal Security in the Inner City

The traditional way to view the threat to internal security is as subversion--the effort to destabilize, weaken, or destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional confines. There are varying levels of instability which bring peril upon a nation. At the extreme are the threats of riot, rebellion, insurrection, and civil war which are oriented towards the integrity of the nation-state, its civil institutions, and vital public property. It is within this narrow band of extremes that national governments usually begin to give serious consideration to internal threats. Domestic political violence and the threat of criminal violence, which are not directly targeted at the integrity of the nation-state, are generally excluded from analyses of national security threats, being treated instead as the responsibility of local law enforcement agencies.

The security objectives in internal security threat scenarios aim generally "to contain violence while seeking to cut the roots of the problem with a political solution."⁵⁶ For thousands of urban dwellers, stable governments have not resulted in the fostering of a progressive social climate where liberty and democracy are protected. Neither is there a physically secure environment. There abounds instead in these communities, a prevailing sense of fear and insecurity. Loyal urban dwellers in inner-city communities are threatened by high levels of criminal violence and are concerned about the state's ability to offer protection to them. They are less concerned about whether the violence their communities face is due to the actions of disloyal subversives or criminal-minded gangsters.

In his contribution to the debate on interventionist doctrine, Dr. Larry Cable considered all military interventions in the context of an insurgency. He described them all as "external attempts to impose, induce, facilitate, or maintain social and political stability in societies or polities experiencing insurgency."⁵⁷ From among the factors important to success in a military intervention, Cable crystallizes two which were crucial *tools* for both the interventionary and the internal players. They are *legitimacy and coercion*.

He stressed that in attempting to establish and protect legitimacy, emphasis was to be placed on "mechanisms designed to enhance perceptions."⁵⁸ In relation to coercion, Cable suggested that a credible capacity to coerce was necessary, but he cautioned that "coercion is defined by the recipient and never the inflicter."⁵⁹ Dr. Cable suggested that the effective application of the tools will allow for the establishment of authority over the population. He argued that success required at least a threshold measure of the sum of perceptions of legitimacy and credible capacity to coerce and that it was possible to determine beforehand that critical threshold.

The makeup of the social geography and human landscape of the inner city, as it has been sketched presents the terrain on which the threat analysis and the applicability of the crucial *tools* for a successful intervention into the affairs of the community have to take place.

Following Cable's model, the gang takes the place of the insurgent group for the purpose of the analysis, being an armed group that may come in conflict with the legitimate authority of the state, albeit at the level of the local community. The competition for the support of the residents is of primary importance, for it is this support that counts for legitimacy and constitutes the center of gravity⁶⁰ for both the gangs and the security forces. Of comparable significance is the credible capacity to coerce, which in the case of the gangs allows for the protection of the center of gravity, even when community support is not willingly forthcoming.

A military intervention would only be considered after it had been established that law enforcement agencies had lost control. This infers that gangs would have established effective control of the streets. The gangs' claim of legitimacy hinges on their image as protectors and providers. This image was not established overnight. Gangs rose in prominence as local law enforcement proved their own ineptness to deal with the security problems of residents, as the economic transactions of the community retreated from the formal market to the informal and often underground economy, and as the inner city became segregated from the rest of the society. The gangs have risen to their central position in the life of inner-city communities by default, but have become entrenched because of their effective use of coercion, to eliminate all threats to their viability.

It is the use of physical violence and the threat of violence by the gangs that trample on the civil liberties of residents within the communities that accommodate, as well as those that oppose, them. In the informal underground economy, transactions and interpersonal exchanges are regulated by the use of violence, not by civility, reciprocity, demand, or supply. Violence is

applied to settle the simplest of disputes, so that even the very trivial becomes issues of life and death. Allegiance to those who control the implements of violence is natural, not out of affection but because to withhold such allegiance would be against the basic instincts of self-preservation.

The decisive point for the gangs has to be viewed as that which sustains its legitimacy in the community. This amounts to its capacity to coerce as well as its perceived status as a provider and protector of the community. Because support for gangs is partly coerced and partly due to faulty perceptions of reality, there will be opportunities to undermine this with the appropriate security strategy. Gangs will reach their culmination point and be defeated when their capacity to coerce is neutralized and when they are relieved of their functions as provider and protector. The center of gravity and culminating points for the security forces are similar to those of the gangs. Unfortunately for the police, gangs have enjoyed far better success with their strategy for protecting their center of gravity.

If one takes as valid, Cable's thesis that the sum of legitimacy and coercive ability is a constant, then gangs must rank very high on coercion and low on legitimacy. The gang's big claim to fame as the *protector of the community* is a fallacy, even though it may do a better job than the police at withstanding attacks on the community from opposing gangs. To establish credibility as a community protector, gangs have to first earn a reputation of being the baddest there is in the neighborhood. Any lesser reputation will only draw the attention and fire of rival gangs on the community. So while a gang may establish dominance over its home-based community, it is often of little utility when it comes to protecting the community from outside influences. Where then is its legitimacy as a community protector? It would appear to rest in the community's willingness to accept a little protection as against none. The perception of gang legitimacy is on the basis of its contribution to the community's security, but this is only marginally reinforced by reality.

The relatively weaker gangs not only encourage rival attacks on the community, but also drain it of its meager resources. Weak gangs would therefore be more deserving of the title of parasite than that of either a protector or provider, especially if the police strategy to keep gangsters in the crime containment zones was succeeding. This because in return for its negligible contribution to the community's output, gangs still extract a subsistence living from the community and continue to hold on to power. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's manual on street gangs as quoted by Delk describes the effects of *gangsterism* this way:

Not only is the citizenry in mortal danger from street gangs, but the influence wielded by the gangs has a trickle down effect on all aspects of life for residents of an area afflicted with a street gang. Street gangs prey upon their neighborhood much like a malignant growth which continues to spread through its host until only a wasted shell remains.⁶¹

Some gangsters do attempt to play a *Robin Hood* role by committing crimes outside the community and bringing the rewards back in. It is the actions of this very category of gangsters which drove the last productive enterprises from the inner city, contributing to the paucity of employment opportunities and the resulting dependency on welfare assistance. To the extent that gangs can transfer capital into the community or convey the perception that they are performing this function, they may reinforce their image as providers and their claim to some legitimacy. However, any such transfer in reality, is not distributed evenly throughout the community. Transfers go to the few family members with the closest ties to individual gangsters. While *gangsterism* depreciates social capital and lessens the economic prospect of the whole community, the benefits flow to only a few. The majority pay the price without reaping the rewards of the crimes. Where then is the legitimacy of the gang as a provider for the community? Again the reality and the perception are poles apart, but the perceptions are often sufficient to gain legitimacy for gangs in a *marginalized* community. It is against this formidable threat that civil law enforcement has been pitted.

The Relevance of the Constabulary in the Inner City

Historically, the constable was drawn from a local community, given training in the law, and invested with authority to enforce the laws within the confines of a familiar community. The policing concept presupposes a cooperative population that appreciates the benefits of observing the law. It also employs the principle of deterrence, whereby a highly visible representative of the law with discretionary authority to intrude on the personal liberties of individuals against whom there is a *reasonable assumption* and *probable cause*⁶² of guilt, is expected to lower the benefits to be derived from breaking the law.

In addition to providing a deterrence, law officers or peace officers, as they are also called, help to pacify grievances occurring between residents and between residents and the institutions of the state. When deterrence and the personal intervention of the police prove inadequate, constables may exercise powers of arrest to restrain wrongdoers. Charges may be laid against offenders who are in time brought before a court for prosecution and formal redress. In and of itself, the existence of the law does not insure compliance. The law is of marginal value as a deterrent unless there is a high degree of certainty of deviants being caught, backed up by effective sanctions commensurate with the crime committed.

Resort to the use of force by the police is a common feature of the inner city where the relationship between the police and the residents is one of mutual distrust. This unhealthy relationship breeds antagonism, which continues to make the application of force necessary. The general manner in which force has been exercised by the police in this context, further hurts the police-community relationship, and does not help with achieving its objectives and is therefore counterproductive. Yet as the criminal threat grew, more and more special law enforcement units were formed which relied on coercion and military type of capabilities to perform police

functions, contributing to greater alienation rather than a solution of the inner-city security dilemma.

The clear evidence is that civil law enforcement has lost the battle in the most severe areas and is losing it rapidly in others. This acknowledgment will not come in a public address, but the reality is nevertheless evident in the inability of local authorities to enforce the rule of law and to bring even known murderers to justice. Other credible indicators which testify of the failure of law enforcement's efforts and the desperate need for a viable security alternative for the failed inner-city communities include:

1. The inability of the police to *walk a beat* in the community. This may be due to the threat of confrontation with a superior foe, or just the police's perception that the community is unsafe.
2. The necessity to employ military type of capabilities and tactics as a matter of routine, such as moving in strength of platoon or larger and using rapid fire automatic weapons, or conversely moving with stealth under the cover of darkness to achieve the element of surprise.
3. Statistical indicators, although often underutilized,⁶³ have the potential to graphically illustrate through mapping the dispersion of violent crimes across the neighborhoods of the inner city, the existence of *crime containment zones*. The consistent pattern of high concentration of violent crimes within identifiable communities as opposed to the whole county or city would confirm the failure of policing measures to protect those communities.

"Since the police are given authority not over national enemies, but over their statutory peers, more restrained behavior is expected of them."⁶⁴ To equip the police with military capabilities (equipment and tactics), which were intended for "circumstances where the protection of constitutional freedoms cannot receive the consideration needed,"⁶⁵ is tantamount to an admission that the situation is beyond the scope of what law enforcement was intended to

contain. If the authorities are ready to admit that such is the scenario in the inner city, then they must proceed to identify the most suitable means of applying military capabilities to help resolve the domestic crisis.

The failure of civil law enforcement and the breakdown of law and order, facilitates the consolidation of informal centers of power around those who have demonstrated the capacity to manage violence to meet their objectives--the gangs.⁶⁶ There can be little doubt about who holds the sway over failed inner-city communities. Irrespective of whom holds the political office, at the level of the local community the dominant gang holds the reigns. In this scenario the police become irrelevant to the ethical norms which are operating.

The reasons for the failure of the efforts of law enforcement and the factors which preclude success of current security initiatives have to be deduced. Law enforcement ranked lower than gangs on both perceptions of legitimacy and credible capacity to coerce. Although contributing precious little, gangs gave the perception of being benefits providers; although putting communities at risk, they were also able to posture as community protectors. By trying to eliminate an entity that the community perceived as a legitimate provider and protector, the police came to be viewed as hostile and part of the threat to the welfare of the community. The police center of gravity was thus exposed and was easily undermined.

In addition to being viewed as part of the threat, law enforcement personnel are often regarded as a nuisance by persons operating in the informal and underground economy. Police personnel are of little relevance to someone having difficulty with completing a transaction in the informal and underground economies. In fact, the presence of the police is likely to impede transactions of the sort. The perceptions of police legitimacy are further diminished because their presence complicates the means which have to be employed to allow deviants to reap the high rewards attributed to breaking the law. There are no redeeming of claims in terms of providing

for the community. Neither the police nor the local authorities to which they are accountable can make credible offers of wooing private businesses to return to the inner city, and any offer to provide employment opportunities at public expense would only be regarded as entitlements, not conditional on cooperation with official law enforcement.

Perceptions about the ability of the police to protect the community are also not enhanced by police strategy and methodology. For inner-city youth a public association with the police is at least as hazardous as public association with known gangsters. Association with the police could raise suspicion and earn individuals the dubious life threatening reputation of police informer. Police are still battling with witness protection schemes. Trust and confidence cannot be built when witnesses are harassed and murdered by associates of accused gangsters.

Community policing, which is being touted as the way to go to bridge the gap between the police and the community, meets a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in the inner city. It is no small task to introduce the concept in communities where police community relations have suffered from decades of distrust and instances of abuse, where there "was too weak a relationship between those who lived in and cared about the areas and the police who patrolled them."⁶⁷ After years of attempting to introduce community policing and Neighborhood Watches in Kingston, Jamaica, only middle-class communities have managed to record any success. In the troubled inner-city communities, dominant gangs have continued to wield influence. This is understandable, since the objectives of Neighborhood Watch

are likely to make the greatest difference when subjective rewards of crime are low, the value assigned to neighborhood opinion is high and the background reinforcements are substantial. And those areas are likely to be the ones where crime rates are already low and social cohesion already high.⁶⁸

Police are also hampered in their use of coercion, their being under the constraints of the law and the requirement to be reasonable in all their actions. Gangsters are under no such

constraints, their actions can be harsh and swift in resolving conflicts in their domain. The relative ease with which gangsters can apply disguise or modify their behavior, hampers police targeting efforts. The inevitable result is that many innocent residents would end up being treated as suspects by the police. This creates an adversarial relationship with persons whose support the police require to bring gangsters to justice. Shortage of prison space and the difficulty of applying the death sentence in most liberal democracies severely weaken the coercive power of the state. The cumulative effect of the above is that the police have reached an early culmination. Notwithstanding its culmination, however, the police continued its operational strategy assuring its certain defeat.

In a community where there exists a center of power, whether formal or not, that has a separate set of interests and ethics from those of the legal-formal authority, then residents face the choice of which power center to obey. The same factors which would cause observance of civil law--certainty of being caught and severity of sanctions--are the very ones which impact on the decision-making process used by residents and cause them to observe the rule of the gang. The reality of the inner-city as highlighted above is that the benefits of compliance with the legal formal authority are perceived by the majority as severely diminished. Not only is the police methodology for applying the concept of deterrence and sanctions inefficient in the inner-city, but the surveillance and sanction systems of the gangs operate swiftly and decisively to enforce compliance with the gangs agendas.

Situations of this sort prompt consideration by the state regarding the use of force to preserve order in the community. Failure on the part of the police "to react quickly or the belief that the authorities will not use force" were found to be among the factors contributing to escalations in lawlessness during civil disturbances.⁶⁹ Hobbes was correct that: "Covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all."⁷⁰ Again the question

arises as to which organ is best suited to employ the instrument of force: peace officers or the professional managers of violence? Willard Barber and C. Neal Ronning, who investigated the military role in meeting the insurgency threat in Latin America, would confront those contemplating the military option with the question: "Can not the civilian organizations, public and private, national and alien, do the job?"⁷¹ Throughout history there have been instances when they either would not or could not. In the case of the failed inner-city communities, it would appear that the police will not succeed for the local environment as it makes the police largely irrelevant. Before the police can reestablish their rightful status, the violent gangs have to be defeated. This objective the police cannot achieve on their own.

Citizens' Response to Domestic Security Crises

An internal security policy which is geared towards preserving the loyalty of the populace to the state, but which comes up short in the protection of the populace, leaves the populace little option but to seek out private means whereby they may protect themselves. The efforts of gangs in this regard have already been mentioned, but what are the options for inner-city residents who are not gangsters? Within the inner city where traditional resources are sparse, residents have adopted unconventional methods to meet their security needs. Some of these include: "mutual suspicion (strangers are dangerous until they prove themselves otherwise), ties of kinship and ethnicity (our own kind are safer than people who are different), knowledge about character (street gossip), and clues as to probable behavior (husky, ill-dressed young men are more threatening than slender, neatly dressed ones)."⁷² Individual actions do not, however, resolve the dilemma for personal security nor that of the wider community:

What they settle for may help them manage their individual problems of security, but it has the unintended effect of intensifying the problem for the neighborhood as a whole. Settling for friends of doubtful repute weakens the strength of the reinforcements associated with high repute; settling for guarded personal disclosures and relying on ties of ethnicity and kinship

lessens the chances that universal rather than particular standards will reinforce behavior; and meeting force with force increases the value attached to physical prowess and pugnacity at the expense of those rewards that might come from cooperative action and official law enforcement. A divided and parochial neighborhood becomes more divided and parochial, especially if it is ethnically diverse.⁷³

There is a popular notion that "the widespread possession of firearms in itself deters crime."⁷⁴ The most important tool in the inner city's underground economy is the firearm, it conveys power and status to its possessor. Firearm possession is regulated not only by the forces of supply and demand, but more importantly by the community Dons who wield power in that market. Individuals who are prepared to actively support the agenda of the gang--whether to fight off opposing gangs or to protect the integrity of a drug market--will have no problem gaining access to arms and ammunition. On the other hand individuals who desire to resist gangs and who attempt obtain weapons through the official firearms market would be very unlikely to get past security checks. In the event that they were successful they would expose themselves to added risk, since weapons in the community that are not under the control of the gang are likely to be regarded as hostile to the gang and their owners could be killed. This determines the pattern of weapon holdings in the inner city; weapon holders are typically gangsters. Private weapons in the hands of loners offer little or no protection to inner-city residents who desire to resist the local gang influence.

Resources available to residents in affluent neighborhoods are more diverse and abundant at both the individual and the collective level. They start out from a more advantageous position of a lower threat of physical violence. Bruce Briggs writing from the perspective of the affluent stated, "A good portion of the most heinous crime, murder, is not a serious source of fear . . . murders] although personal tragedies, are not a social concern--ditto for crimes committed by criminals against one another."⁷⁵ This is a common view among the affluent reflecting the reality of their circumstances and lack of appreciation for the plight of those in crisis.

All who are concerned over their security and welfare will attempt measures to assure their own protection if the state fails in this regard. Restricted access⁷⁶ is one method tried in both communities. In the case of affluent communities, restricted access seeks to bar undesirables from entering the neighborhood. The aim is the same for inner-city communities--restricting the access of rival gangs. The results, however, inhibit the process of human development and human security as well as the accumulation of social capital. Persons who could offer constructive leadership and training or who could bring investments into the community are often the ones excluded, not because residents would not wish for them to come in, but because they are too scared to enter. The frequency of intergang rivalry is a clear indicator of the failure of restrictive access, as practiced in the inner city.

Halpern made the point that community initiatives reflected a "persistent tendency to ask those with the [least] . . . resources to draw on those resources to better their lives; to ask those whose trust has been betrayed over and over . . . to join a process requiring significant trust; and to ask the excluded to find a way to become included."⁷⁷

He also highlighted the difficulty experienced by residents of the inner city who try to change their environment in a positive way. He was of the view that "the logic of neighborhood initiative . . . can become illogical under conditions of resource scarcity and social exclusion."⁷⁸ This view is supported by several authors who consider the inner-city community "too narrow and too lacking in resources to perform such functions on its own. . . . Communities need help from outside to meet their social problems."⁷⁹

The increasing crime threat has goaded some docile, affluent neighborhoods to embrace the concept of either or both police and community initiatives to combat crime. According to the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC), community initiatives like Neighborhood Watch, McGruff House, Operation Identification, community cleanups, before- and after-school

programs, and drug and gang prevention activities have recorded some success. Ordinary people in partnership with the police are said to "have cleared drug dealing out of their neighborhoods, made parks safe for children and side walks secure for play, curbed assaults, reduced muggings, wiped out graffiti and vandalism, improved local services and started programs for teens and elders."⁸⁰

The NCPC acknowledged that crime may have a strong grip in some areas and made several recommendations for dealing with fear and facing the severe violence of these communities. The NCPC suggests

to counter fear: First stick together. There is strength in numbers. Most criminals attack people who are alone, not in groups. Second, work with the police to set up or publicize ways for people to report crimes without giving their names. Third, if you're worried, you don't have to do your work right in the middle of the danger. . . . Fourth, start with the pluses. Do things that make the community more attractive.⁸¹

For the *tough situations*--the norm for many inner-cities' areas--the NCPC offers consoling words, "maybe it won't be easy or quick, but you and your neighbors can reclaim your community."⁸² These suggestions may be good for middle-class communities which are trying to halt the development of the crime problem in their areas. They come far too late for the majority of the inner city and especially for those communities where the gangs are already in control.

In less severely affected communities where community policing is beginning to work, expectations are not very high either. Part of the problem is that prison space is limited. "The contacts developed through community policing help put a suspect in jail. But even in cases of extreme brutality, the sentences served by criminals can be short because prison space is tight. . . . Only one criminal is jailed for every 100 violent crimes committed."⁸³ If there are little risks of real punishment facing gang members, then measures to protect the population from the threat of gangs may be futile. Effective countermeasures will need to emphasize deterrence and reducing

the opportunities for committing the most heinous crimes, above efforts to apply sanctions of incarceration.

Community Tolerance Limits and Attitudes
Towards Security Interventions

Communities do not fail in their process of development in a single fatal fall, but rather, their sorry state comes as a result of prolonged steady decline and neglect. During this period of decline, there are many warning signs which shout to residents: *Get out of this place!* The law enforcement agencies are attuned to the signs of decline, but are aware that a reversal in trend requires more than a law enforcement agency can provide. Their responses are therefore often too weak or too inconsistent to make an impact. Police responses to residents requests for help also send signals. In the case of the crime infested community of Phillips, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, some residents expressed the view that:

The neighborhood has become an undeclared "containment zone" in which the city keeps its undesirables bottled up. . . . [Police] hassle [criminals] right outside the neighborhood . . . and frequently warn regular citizens that this is a dangerous area. So the effect is that they're telling the bad people to stay in Phillips and the good people to get out.⁸⁴

Those who have the option of relocating do so; those remaining are not necessarily tolerant or supportive of crime. Many residents remain throughout the period of decline because they have no other option, not because they tolerate crime. Ben Garza, a father whose son was paralyzed as a result of a drive-by shooting, makes the point that people in the ghetto "do not want drugs or gangs any more than the general society does."⁸⁵ The majority are not participants in, nor beneficiaries of crime. Residents will often resist the takeover of their communities by criminals and will resort to abandonment, only after all their attempts have failed.

This point in time comes long after the civil authorities themselves have failed to protect the residents. In the case of the Phillips neighborhood, a city councilman responsible for about

half of the neighborhood conceded that crime was out of control there. He acknowledged the persistent crime problem and noted that "in some sense the city has failed this neighborhood. Government in general has failed the inner-cities."⁸⁶ He also refuted a suggestion that the neighborhood had deliberately tolerated crime, saying instead that the community had been neglected and was in need of some relief.⁸⁷

With each passing day, inner-city residents are forced more and more to adjust to the realities of life, this is a part of the basic instinct of self-preservation. After years of the downward spiral and the loss of hope for a better way, communities appear to acquiesce to gang rule. In the late stages of decline and the onset of the *culture of death*, the ability of residents to resist all but disappears, as alternative centers of power emerge. When the police withdraw or are suppressed and gangs take over the streets, vocal opposition to the gangs is as good as a death sentence.

Luckily, for the community of Phillips, residents have succeeded in getting national publicity for their "first desperate act" of asking for the community to be declared a federal disaster area, because of the crisis of persistent crime.⁸⁸ In the failed communities, the citizens' last desperate cries for help either went unheard or could only manage to generate the standard weak, half-hearted, big-on-talk, tried-and-ailed, law enforcement responses. Then followed the departure of the most articulate voices and the incumbent and future generation of community leaders that had the means to do so. Then came silence of the people and the sound of gunshots every night, as the gangs fought for dominance.

A greater tolerance of the deteriorating situation within the inner city has long been displayed by the wider society outside of the inner city. It usually requires a dramatic explosion of inner-city tensions, such as occurs in a riot or a revolt, before a community's crisis begins to impact on the consciences of those not caught in its midst. It has been suggested that the

political administration did not do enough to curb the spread of drugs through the inner city, because the narcotics trade shifted some economic burdens from the state. James O'Kane alleges that: "Politicians . . . may find drugs potentially attractive: their sale and protection provide a method of making the underclass less of a problem since drug income fuels the underground economy of virtually all our impoverished inner-city neighborhoods even as it robs them."⁸⁹

It has also been suggested, although strongly refuted, that a US government agency facilitated the sale of cocaine by some the American inner-city street gangs to help finance the administration's Central American allies.⁹⁰

Civil society outside of the inner city will be forced to treat seriously the issue as communities beyond the boundaries of the inner city become threatened with the intrusion of narcotics and accompanying violence. Although there are greater options for the provision of security outside of the inner city, it is likely that public pressure will mount on the civil authorities to find effective ways of dealing with the growing national security threat.

There are indications of an increasing sensitivity to the crisis and a resulting lowering in the level of the public tolerance of internal insecurity. It is extremely difficult for a democratic governments to ignore reality and public sentiment and still maintain legitimacy. In the US, legislators ignored Antigang and Youth Violence Control bills introduced in 1996, only to find them reappear for consideration in 1997. The US President has also publicly stated his determination "to break the backs of criminal gangs that have ruined too many lives and stolen too many futures by bringing the full force of the law against them."⁹¹ While legislation is not a sufficient deterrent to violence and crime, these developments indicate a stirring of political will. This may lead eventually to considerations of options previously ignored for political reasons.

¹The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Fact Sheet 12 (April 1994), estimates that there were some 4,881 gangs in the United States in 1991. It also reported that there had been indications of emergence of new gangs in small cities.

²Violence has been declared a public health emergency in America. See C. E. Koop and G. D. Lundberg, "Violence in America: a Public Health Emergency: Time to Bite the Bullet Back," JAMA 267 (1992): 3075-3076.

³Tom Baldy, The Battle for Ulster: A Study of Internal Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1952), 77.

⁴The economy of the Island of Jamaica is heavily dependent on tourism which is its primary earner of foreign exchange. A serious crime problem is sufficient to send severe shocks to the island's economy.

⁵US Dept. of Justice, "Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan" (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, March 1996), iii.

⁶The term blasted neighborhood has also been used to refer to inner-city communities which find themselves in this dilemma of depreciated physical, human, and social capital. See Mark More, "The Epidemic of Youth Violence," MIJCF, Jobs and Capital 4 (Winter 1995): 8)

⁷Residential segregation described as "the structural conditions imposed on blacks that makes intensely deprived communities possible, even likely" have been blamed for the "escalating deterioration of the ghetto." See Robert Halpern, Rebuilding the Inner City: A History of Neighborhood Initiatives to Address Poverty in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 8.

⁸Robert Halpern, Rebuilding the Inner City: A History of Neighborhood Initiatives to Address Poverty in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 3.

⁹J. Wilson and R. Hernnstein, Crime & Human Nature (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 292-311.

¹⁰Mark Moore, "The Epidemic of Youth Violence," Jobs & Capital 4 (Winter 1995): 2.

¹¹Wilson and Hernnstein, 300.

¹²Javier Rodriquez in Ben Garza, "Eradicate The Gang Culture," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1996), 95.

¹³Delores Tucker, "Gangsta Rap May Encourage Gang Behavior," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996), 22.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., 12.

¹⁶See Jeffrey Meyer, "Many Street Gangs Are Not Dangerous," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996), 70-76.

¹⁷Wilson and Hernnstein, 297.

¹⁸Ibid., 303.

¹⁹James Delk, Fires & Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ECT Publishers, 1995), 14-15.

²⁰James O'Kane, "The Narcotics Trade Incites Gang Violence," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996), 27.

²¹Erik Parsels, "Capitalism Fosters Gang Behavior," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996), 43. He identified drugs and prostitution as the only thriving business opportunities in the inner city.

²²O'Kane, 26.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., 27.

²⁵See Robert Fisher, "Social Services and Community in the New Private City," Urban Affairs Review 31, no. 4 (March 1996): 558.

²⁶David Goldsworth, "Thinking Politically About Development," Development and Change 19, no. 3 (July 1988): 511-512.

²⁷For a fuller appreciation of the extent of witness intimidation see the full article by Sam Howe Verhovek, "Gang Intimidation of Witnesses Is a Growing Problem," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996), 77-81.

²⁸Wilson and Hernnstein, 298.

²⁹Ibid., 297

³⁰Cozic, 13.

³¹See Michael S. Kaye, "Residential Security in The Year 2000," Security in the Year 2000 and Beyond, ed. Louis Tyska and Lawrence Fennelly (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1987).

³²Cozic, 13.

³³Ibid., 13-14.

³⁴Ibid., 14.

³⁵Ibid., 100.

³⁶Inge Kaul, "Guest Editorial," Development - Journal of the Society for International Development 4 (1994): 1.

³⁷Ibid., 3.

³⁸Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1950), xxvi.

³⁹Ibid., xxiv.

⁴⁰Jean Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, 1762, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950), 45.

⁴¹Ibid., 19.

⁴²The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lays down "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations." All Western democracies have pledged to pursue them until they achieve effective recognition and observance.

⁴³Hobbes, xxiii.

⁴⁴Wilson and Hernstein, 302.

⁴⁵Hobbes, xiv.

⁴⁶Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 64.

⁴⁷Lawrence Vale, Limits of Civil Defense (New York: St. Martens Press, 1987), 15.

⁴⁸US Senator Sam Nunn, "Domestic Missions for the Armed Forces" (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 1993), 2.

⁴⁹Peter Peterson quoted in Philip Brehm and Wilbour Gray, "Alternate Missions for the Army" (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992), 5.

⁵⁰For a discussion on some of the leading views concerning sources of conflict see the article by Robert Walz, "Describing the International Security Environment: The Clash of Ideas," Selected Readings Book (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff

College, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, 1996), B1-B12. See also Paul A Goble, "Ethnicity as Explanation, Ethnicity as Excuse" (C520 Military Operations Other Than War Syllabus, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 45-48.

⁵¹Huntington, 3.

⁵²Ibid., 64.

⁵³See Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1789-1878 (Washington, DC: United States Army, Center of Military History, 1988). He noted that: "from its beginnings, [the militia was] also an instrument for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion, the enforcement of law, and the performance of a host of other services at the behest of both governors and local officials," p 3.

⁵⁴Brehm and Gray, 27.

⁵⁵Huntington, 3.

⁵⁶Tom Baldy, 92.

⁵⁷Larry Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog" (CGSC C520 Syllabus, Military Operations Other Than War, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 79.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 80.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 6-7.

⁶¹Delk, 15.

⁶²Definitions of probable cause require "that there be reasonable grounds for belief of guilt--a belief that is supported by evidence and inclines the mind to assume guilt but which may leave some room for doubt." Paul Weston and K. Wells, Criminal Evidence for Police, 3d ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1986), 131-132.

⁶³This sort of data is collected but is seldom presented as police statistics are not generally published for geographic entities below the level of county. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Street Gang Detail produced a manual on street gangs in 1992. In it they "point out that the location of gang concentrations almost precisely duplicates a map profiling poverty areas." See Delk, 15.

⁶⁴Dick Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 122.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Wilson and Hernnstein, 297.

⁶⁷Moore, 2.

⁶⁸Wilson and Hernnstein, 309.

⁶⁹Anthony Deane-Drummond, Riot Control (London: Thornton Cox, 1975), 9-10.

⁷⁰Hobbes, xiv.

⁷¹Willard Barber and C. Neal Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counter Insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1996), 11.

⁷²Wilson and Hernnstein, 304.

⁷³Ibid., 304-305.

⁷⁴B. Bruce-Briggs, "The Great American Gun War," The Gun Control Debate: You Decide, ed. Lee Nisbet (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 78.

⁷⁵Ibid., 75.

⁷⁶There are an estimated 20,000 gated communities in the USA, which provide homes for about eight million persons. These private communities employ security guards and often electronic devices in addition to controlled gates to restrict access. The security arrangements comes with a high price tag. See David Diamond, "Behind Closed Gates," USA Weekend, (31 January - 2 February 1997): 4-5.

⁷⁷Halpern, 12.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹See Robert Fisher, book review of "Social Services and Community in the New Private City," Urban Affairs Review 31, no. 4 (March 1996): 560.

⁸⁰See "Not Alone, Not Afraid: United Against Crime" (Washington, DC: National Crime Prevention Council, May 1996), 9.

⁸¹Ibid., 10.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³See "Crime and Punishment," The Economist, 27 January 1996, 25-28.

⁸⁴See William Souder, "A Disaster Area in the Making," Washington Post, National Weekly Ed. (13 January 1997): 30.

⁸⁵Ben Garza, "Eradicate The Gang Culture," Gangs: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Charles Cozic (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1996), 97.

⁸⁶Souder, 30.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹O'Kane, 25.

⁹⁰Associated Press, "Gang Sold Drugs to Help Contras, Paper Says," The Kansas City Star, 21 August 1996, A3.

⁹¹Robert Jackson et al., "Clinton Puts Priority on Curtailing Gang Crime," Los Angeles Times, 12 January 1997, A1.

CHAPTER 3

MILITARY FORCE AS AN OPTION FOR COMBATING GANGS

The idea of using military force in law enforcement has over time come to be associated with tyrannical governments. Some of the most scathing criticisms to be levied against the military were made by Karl Liebknecht, who wrote concerning militarism in a less than free German society at the verge of the first World War. He described the use of military force as “a powerful obstacle in the way of every kind of progress, . . . an ingenious and highly efficient instrument for closing by force the valve of the social steam-boiler.”¹

The “fears of dangerous military activity” which were persistent in nineteenth century British society are understandable, for they were founded upon the reality of the times.² But there remained few security options available to the sovereign up to the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. According to Midlane, “prior to the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829 (and other local police forces in ensuing years) the only weapon with which to meet this challenge [to the stability of society] was with the regular Army, supplemented by the Militia and yeomanry.”³ Today instead of calling on the military, the authorities show a preference towards equipping their constabulary forces with military type capabilities. The debate is therefore no longer one about the use of force by the state. There, however, needs to be a debate over the quality and effectiveness of the force being applied.

The use of military force in the domestic environment is generally viewed as an undesirable prospect in liberal democracies. In fact, the very existence of a large standing Army was sometimes thought to be “contrary to the principles of constitutional liberty, and dangerous

to the rights of an unarmed civil population.”⁴ There were others who considered it “necessary to insure the due execution of the law.”⁵ The American attitude became negative following the Civil War, and by 1878 legislation was passed to control the practice of military involvement in law enforcement.⁶ This legislation had the potential to protect the military from political exploitation and the populace from intimidating force. The traditionally negative stereotypical view can be challenged by more recent experiences with the employment of the military on anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics operations. Citizens caught up in the crises have generally responded favorably towards military involvement.

The criminal gangs that threaten inner-city communities, through their heavy involvement in the drug trade and their indiscriminate use of violence, may be placed under the purview of threats for which the military option has been favorably considered. Although current doctrine does not specifically address combating gangs, neither does it address specific terrorist acts. Threats have to be measured in terms of their potential to harm whatever is at risk. In the case of civil disturbances in the US it requires the personal action of the president to first order persons disturbing the peace or posing an insurgent threat to disperse and retire peaceably before he may order federal troops to act to protect federal property and functions. In the case of anti-terrorism and counter narcotics there are less strictures on the president, in that he need not give a warning to the belligerents. He must still, however, give the approval for the military’s involvement in a law enforcement role.

There are also differences in the British society’s attitude towards the use of military force to counter public order versus terrorist threats. While “troops have not been used in a general public order role on the streets of Great Britain since 1926.”⁷ There has been a marked increase in antiterrorist operations since the 1970s. The latter threat is associated with greater public acceptability and legitimacy for the military option.

Since law enforcement is the preserve of the civil authorities, it would be normal to expect that these authorities would indicate when help is required. Under common law a constable may call on private citizens to assist with the apprehension of an offender or the prevention of a crime. This principle allows a soldier like any other citizen, to respond to police requests for assistance. A request for institutional military assistance is, however, channeled through the political directorate. Traditionally, the political directorate reserves the option of military intervention for those occasions when law enforcement agencies have been openly overwhelmed as in the case of civil disturbances and riots or when threats against the state rise to the level of a revolt rebellion or insurrection.

Frequent resort to the military for law enforcement support would be a bad reflection on the civil authorities, since this would be indicative of persistent grievances on the part of the populace. To avoid the appearance of a heavy-handed administration, governments have tended to increase law enforcement capabilities to respond to crises, to reduce reliance on military assistance. The failure of society to conceive of a military intervention that could manage the use of force so as to protect rather than abuse civil liberties and that could be selective in the application of deadly force has also contributed to the hostility towards the concept of a military being responsive to security needs in the domestic environment.

Professional pride on the part of law enforcement agencies must also be considered a factor in the decision on whether or not to call for military assistance. Where this is high, law enforcement officials desiring to demonstrate competence at their jobs would be reluctant to call on the military. If, however, professionalism and morale among law enforcement personnel were low, there would likely be less of an interest in protecting image and prestige, and less apprehension about calling for help from the military. The Jamaican Constabulary Force which suffered from very heavy public criticisms for lack of professional conduct during the 1970s and

1980s, became very dependent on military support, to the annoyance of the Jamaican military. Being unable or unwilling at the time to clean up the police force and responding to public demands for better security, the government ordered the military to render the necessary assistance to the police. This case shows the potential of public pressure to influence the decision to intervene militarily in a domestic security crisis, where there is confidence in the military and where a high premium is placed on the security of the populace.

The actions and attitudes, ostensibly to protect both the civil population and the military institution from abuse and to ensure that distinct roles for the military and police were maintained, are--in the reality of the modern era of civil-military relations--more about protecting the status quo of those in authority. Were the security of the population to be the focus of internal security policy, then the bankruptcy of current security strategy would have already been acknowledged and other remedies sought.

Although law enforcement agencies are responsible for signaling the need for military assistance, it is a political decision whether or not to deploy the military. The policy maker should have some criteria for validating the requirement. This may be a relatively simple matter in civil disturbances; the retreat of law enforcement personnel during a civil disturbance may be sufficient to validate the desirability of military intervention.⁸ An advancing mob silhouetted by a blazing city is graphic enough to raise alarms. Far less eye-catching but nonetheless melodramatic is the loss of police effectiveness in the inner city, which gives way to gang rule. Even with the requisite political will to intervene militarily, the neglect of the indicators of law enforcement failure would cause military intervention to be delayed till the latest possible time.

The threat to civil liberties during a military intervention arises not because of the military's presence. The misfortune occurs if civil authorities neglect to implement measures to address the root causes of the conflict or the source of the grievances, demonstrating a naïve

expectation that a stable peace could be built solely through the application of force. In the words of Richard Shephard: "The military can function as a stabilizing force enabling government to implement reforms. If the military is employed as a substitute it is now being abusive to both civil society and the military itself by distancing the population and creating a no win situation."⁹

This trend of greater acceptability of a military role in protecting the populace from the threat of violence from domestic sources is also evident in developing countries. In Jamaica, as in many young nations, the military of necessity, played a fairly active role in bringing stability to the country. The military was active before political independence when they performed the wishes of the British monarch and continued in the post independence era, under democratic governments of the people and for the people. The attitude towards the involvement of the Jamaican military in law enforcement support has been similar to that in both the US and Britain. The military is often regarded as a necessary evil, a reliable insurance for domestic security, but one only to be utilized with caution.

Midlane supports the notion that "a distinction should be drawn between the activities of the military when engaged in a public order role and that used in counter terrorist operations."¹⁰ Where there existed a disgruntled public with grievances of a political nature against the civil authorities, it may be reasonable to argue that military force would threaten the civil rights and freedoms and worsen the antiestablishment sentiments of the people. On the other hand, a reluctance to employ military capabilities to counter the terrorist type threat of violent gangs, where law enforcement agencies have been proven inadequate, could reasonably be regarded as a dereliction of duty by the state.

Legal Considerations for Military Support
to Law Enforcement

Civil liberties are circumscribed by the general will of the people and reflected in the supreme law of the land, indirectly prescribed by the people themselves. The high value placed on civil liberty means that it may not be swept to the corner in order to assure security. Barbara Dority, commenting on extremist right wing groups in the US paraphrased Justice Thurgood Marshall thus: "History teaches us that the gravest threats to liberty come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. We must not sacrifice the essential rights of a free people. . . . We have an obligation instead to fight fear with reason."¹¹

Midlane states that in the United Kingdom "the primary legal basis for [military aid to the civil power] MACP is not Statute law but Common Law."¹² Under Common Law, the soldier is under the same obligation as every other citizen "to come to the aid of the civil power when the civil power requires his assistance to enforce law and order . . . and to use no more force than is necessary."¹³ Two provisions of the American Constitution legitimized the practice of using military force namely: the provision for the enforcement of federal law or authority and, the constitutional guarantee of a Republican form of government to the states.¹⁴

A mixture of statute laws and administrative procedures for the military have evolved to limit the discretion of military commanders to respond to requests for assistance. The authority on whether or not to intervene militarily in the domestic environment in the modern era, is reserved at the highest political level. In the US the Posse Comitatus Act (13 USC 1385) is the specific statute that restricts the employment of federal troops on law enforcement duties. The act states:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a *posse comitatus* or other wise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10, 000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.¹⁵

This law has been applied to defense policy effectively prohibiting not only the US Army and Air Force but also the US Navy and Marine Corps, from participating directly:

1. In arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.
2. In surveillance or pursuit.
3. As informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.¹⁶

There are, however, constitutional and statutory exceptions contained in 10 USC 371-380, which allow "the use of the military to execute or enforce the law when necessary to protect civilian property and functions and when necessary to protect federal property and functions."

These also permit the military to share information and provide equipment, facilities, and training to law enforcement agencies. Therefore notwithstanding the Posse Comitatus Act, if the domestic situation is deemed critical enough as to require the military to intervene and perform law enforcement functions, an executive order may accomplish this.¹⁷ Furthermore: "It is noteworthy that the Posse Comitatus Act contained no restrictions on the use of federalized militia as it did on the Regular Army."¹⁸

With regard to the legal constraints against the military, Dick Reavis reported on the Appeal Courts understanding of the purpose of the act: "Congress intended to make unlawful the direct active participation of federal troops in law enforcement activities; Congress did not intend to make unlawful the involvement of federal troops in a passive role in fulfilling law enforcement activities."¹⁹ There remains a degree of uncertainty about exactly what US federal troops can and can't do outside of an executive order. According to Reavis, what is clear about Posse Comitatus in relation to federal troops is that they

may not take an active role in civilian law enforcement, except where drug interdiction is involved. Its passive role can be quite comprehensive. Military personnel can provide a lawman with a rifle, teach him how to use it, supply him with ammunition, even load his weapon for him. But because of the wishes of the Founding Fathers and the authors of the Posse Comitatus Act, soldiers still can't pull the trigger.²⁰

Military Doctrine for Support to Domestic Law Enforcement

The fundamental principles which have governed the military's work in the domestic environment of liberal democracies have been fairly constant, whether operations are conducted at the lower end of the spectrum in passive defense of military installations or in ascending order through sporadic acts of violence and riots; counter terrorist operations; counterinsurgency; civil war or internal armed conflict. The abiding principle of military subordination to civilian authority remains unchallenged in domestic support operations. However, the chief operating principles guiding the military forces of most democratic societies, once they have entered the arena of domestic operations are those of minimum force, and acting within the law.²¹

The law provides that in the prevention of a crime or in the arrest of offenders or suspected offenders, or of persons unlawfully at large, the amount of force which may be used is such force as reasonable in the circumstances; and the law regarding the use of force in self defence is essentially the same.²²

Notwithstanding the general aversion in free society towards turning the military inwards on the people, there have been and will continue to be occasions when law enforcement agencies will be overwhelmed. On these occasions, the appearance of the military may well be a welcome sight for those who treasure the rule of law. Napoleon's dictum, "without an army there is neither independence nor civil liberties,"²³ remains a truism today.

The practice of military intervention over the years has also enforced the principle that "military support supplements, rather than replaces, civil agency responsibilities."²⁴ The purpose of the military's support is to help "civil law enforcement authorities maintain law and order. Law, directives, and regulations restrict the Army from assuming the civil law enforcement mission" while allowing "Army human and physical resources to enhance national security, thus contributing to the nations overall well-being."²⁵

The British doctrine of counterinsurgency identifies six principles which would bear relevance for military interventions to help bring a sense of security to the inner city. These are:

1. Political Primacy and Political Aim.
2. Coordinated Government Machinery.
3. Intelligence and Information.
4. Separating the Insurgent from His Support.
5. Neutralizing the Insurgent.
6. Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning.²⁶

Applying these principles to the inner-city environment would require special consideration of the social and human landscape. The principles are broad enough to allow flexibility to suit the circumstances. They suggest important factors in the planning and conduct of military interventions, without specifying any single best way to execute. The civil authorities and the security forces are advised by this doctrine to establish the political or strategic aim for the inner city. Is gang rule in a crime containment zone to be tolerated or should the affected communities be relieved of gang domination and integrated with the rest of the society?

The second principle raises the issue of how to get government machinery to function in a coordinated manner. This being outside the scope of the military function suggests a very significant role for the civil authorities. Observing the next three principles requires an appreciation for the centers of gravity, the decisive points and the culminating points of both the armed gangs and the security forces. The final principle ensures consideration of how to sustain success once this has been achieved and the military withdrawn. The ensuing discussion further brings out how this doctrine may be applied to help resolve the inner-city dilemma.

The American doctrine for domestic support operations²⁷ teaches six principles for the conduct of operations other than war:

1. Objective--Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. . . . The concepts of mission, enemy, terrain, and time available (METT-T) determine intermediate or subordinate objectives that must be accomplished to achieve the primary objective.

2. Unity of effort--Seek unity of effort toward every objective. Commanders must coordinate with civilian authorities under whose general direction they will fall and clearly understand the lines of authority and control . . . Unity of effort also requires coordination and cooperation among other federal agencies.
3. Legitimacy--Sustain the people's willing acceptance of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
4. Perseverance--Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capabilities in support of strategic gains . . . [which] may require years to achieve desired effects. They may not have a clear beginning or end decisively.
5. Restraint--Apply appropriate military capability prudently. Specific rules of engagement govern the disciplined use of force.
6. Security--Never permit hostile forces to acquire an unexpected advantage...never be lulled into believing that the non-hostile intent of a mission involves little or no risk.²⁷

The guidance offered in these principles would also be relevant for the conduct of security operations in the inner city. Dr. Larry Cable's contribution commented on earlier is in harmony with the established doctrine. A reading of Cable suggests that priority should be placed on legitimacy. His emphasis on understanding and managing the capacity to coerce encompasses the principles of neutralizing the threat, exercising constraint and providing for the security of the forces. He also urged recognition of the importance of a "correct, comprehensive and consensually acceptable understanding . . . [of the] relationship between political goals and military means . . . [as well as] the very real limitations upon the efficacy of military, particularly lethal military operations."²⁸

The inner-city threat environment poses challenges beyond the capacity of civil law enforcement. Civil authorities appear to be still struggling with politically sensitive issues such as determining:

1. When the threat of serious crime transitions to a threat against the stability of the social order.
2. How much coercion, death and destruction is necessary to cause the actions of dangerous gangs to be regarded as acts of terror against the society.

3. How many persons must first be recruited, armed and initiated as gangsters, and how wide a territory would they have to dominate, before admitting to their own loss of influence in the communities.

The resolution to these issues may never be clear in black and white. It will involve a judgment call on the part of those in authority and will be heavily influenced by their reading of public opinion. This public opinion will reflect the relative tolerance of main stream civil society for the status of the inner city. As indicated previously, the growing threat of *gangsterism* is likely to result in greater public concern with domestic security. Local authorities have few remaining options, among them the employment of military force.

National Security and Human Security Interests at Risk

From a security standpoint the problem concerns how to protect communities from the wanton violence perpetrated by armed gangs. The interests at stake include a whole generation of youth from inner-city communities who are being drawn into gang activity and introduced to a criminal lifestyle, thereafter to become a menace to society. At stake are the civil liberties of residents who have the misfortune of being born and having to live in gang dominated, police forsaken, *crime containment* zones. They are constrained by the threat of armed gangs, to conform to the agenda of the gangs. At stake are the lives of thousands, primarily poor, young, black, males, who face the risk of violent death and serious bodily injury at the hands of gangsters. At risk is the national psyche that has to bear the trauma of the constant fear of violent crime. This fear of violence haunts most of society but to varying degrees. The threat is greatest in the inner city but has been drawing nearer to mainstream society.

This is only the security dimension of a complex social ill of growing dimensions. It is a problem that has to be tackled concurrently on all fronts in a *big push*, in order to make any

enduring impact. Bold action is required but, unfortunately, it is easier to deny the gravity of the situation and just keep on operating in the traditional manner, than it is to attempt something new which would take planners “outside the box.”

A Security Strategy and Operational Concept for the Inner City

The strategy employed by civil law enforcement agencies has typically been centered around eliminating the gang: on apprehending members, prosecuting them successfully through the courts, and locking them away; on seizing their illicitly acquired assets; and on forcing their compliance with the law. In this strategy gangs are targeted and pursued as an enemy would be. When the strategy of elimination fails as it has, there is resort to a strategy of containment and attrition, still centered around the gang as enemy. With the difficulty of distinguishing dangerous gangsters from ordinary residents an aura of suspicion and a negative stigma are cast on whoever occupies the crime containment zone. Both these approaches betray any appreciation for what Dr. Cable described as the human landscape. They do not reflect an adequate appreciation for the security needs of the community.

The Community as a Protected Locality

The term civil protection²⁹ which has gone out of vogue with the lowering of the nuclear threat may find new relevance in security doctrine. The concept applied to the inner city would be to protect the local population within the high-risk communities from the threat of attack from outside. The use of force by strong dominating gangs has been shown to be a two-edged sword within inner-city communities. In the inner-city areas of Kingston, for example, communities falling under the domain of powerful gangs are regarded as *garrisons*. Residents within a *garrison* may experience restrictions on their civil liberties and have to live under the coercion of the gang leaders. Such communities, however, seldom face attacks from external gangs.

Residents in communities with weak gangs, or where small gangs are competing for dominance, tend to be the very vulnerable, both to attacks from outside as well to the infighting for supremacy between internal gangs. These communities are referred to in local parlance as *weak fences*. The majority of inner-city areas will not have gangs powerful enough to offer them the status of a *garrison*. The majority suffer the fate of being known as a *weak fence*.

To deter external attacks, vulnerable communities require more than what their indigenous resources can deliver. The demand is thus created for a credible intervening force. To achieve a turnaround in security fortunes will necessitate that the reputation of these communities as *weak fences* be transformed to that of *protected localities*. Local gangs try on their own to earn this reputation for the community, but only end up perpetuating the cycle of violence. The preferred way of achieving the protected locality status is to have this protection provided by the law enforcement agencies. Only a successful intervention of the rule of law can break the cycle of violence--murder-grieving-reprisal-mourning-revenge-lamenting-attack-counterattack--which is self-sustaining in the inner city.

Military Objectives in the Inner City

The purpose of the military forces of a nation is to fight and win the nation's war. Although the failed inner-city community has been described as a virtual war zone with rival gangs as the combatants, gangsters have not, however, been declared as enemies of the state. Instead as citizens, they rightly enjoy all the rights and privileges afforded by the law. The military therefore may not be unleashed upon the citizens, and the laws of the land provide safeguards in this regard. The military, however, has a role in preserving the security of the state and of the people, and governments reserve the right to employ the necessary force to ensure

compliance with the laws. The nature of the military's role must therefore be prescribed within the tolerable limits of a liberal democracy.

There are limits to what may be realistically achieved by the use of force in a free society, whether such force is applied by the military or by law enforcement agencies. The Northern Ireland turmoil is living proof that force cannot eradicate everything.³⁰ Physical force being just one dimension of the concept of internal security is nonetheless important, for it is often required to establish the foundation for building a credible peace. Alongside the application of force must be economic and political initiatives directed at the root of the crisis. To proceed by force without addressing the social concerns of the inner city would raise questions about legitimacy. The great need of the inner city from the peoples' perspective is for human security: the amelioration of poverty and for protection. In the despair and hopelessness of the inner city, gangs actively enhance the perception that they are providers of both community protection and income to these neighborhoods. It has been argued, however, that residents of a local community acquiesced to the agenda set by the gang due to coercion and the lack of credible alternatives, rather than as a result of loyalty. The assumption concerning gang loyalty therefore is that it is a trait restricted to members of the gang and their immediate families.

The objective of a military intervention has to be geared to meet the security dimension of the needs of the local community, while not inhibiting the need for the broader development of human capital. To put it concretely, the objective is to achieve a reduction in the threat of armed violence and the freedom of the local population from the coercive influence of armed gangs. The goal is not the elimination of gangs, for even if this were achievable it would carry too great a cost in human life. Force when applied by the legitimate authorities should, first and foremost, be aimed at protecting the neighborhoods from attacks from gangsters based outside.

The protection must be delivered in such a manner as to relieve gangsters of their perceived role as community protectors. The next order of business would be to nullify the status of local gangsters as the arbiters and regulators over the interpersonal transactions which occur in everyday life in the community.

Success at meeting these objectives could have a significant impact on the economy of local communities. The void, created by any reduction in transactions in the informal or underground economy, would need to be taken up by new opportunities in legitimate endeavors. There already exists a number agencies with projects on paper designed to offer opportunities and help with new economic initiatives in the inner cities, but whose efforts were being inhibited because of the fear of violence, or because inputs when actually provided were being hijacked by those who controlled the reigns. Meeting these needs and filling the voids created as a result of security action, are critical to the establishment of legitimacy of the intervention.

Mission Essential Tasks for Intervening forces

The functions performed by the military would be comparable to some performed on peace enforcing and peacekeeping missions. However, the presence of the constabulary in the domestic situation, as the Force with primary responsibility for law and order duties, such as arrests, searches, and seizures, should make the tasks less complex for the military. The specified tasks for the military would include: (1) the separation of hostile communities; (2) the establishment of protected zones; (3) the protection of lawful civilian authorities in zone; (4) the protection of the community from life threatening external attacks by repelling armed gangs; (5) the provision of escort for police units and security cordons as required; and (6) the conduct of show of force operations.

The implied tasks for a security operation with a mission to protect an urban community would include: (1) delineation and mapping of communities in the area of operations; (2) identification of formal and informal centers of influence in the community; (3) coordination with the identifiable leadership of communities perceived as hostile to each other as well as with the wider political and civic leadership; (4) the establishment of a system for accountability to the community of residents being protected; and (5) reassuring the residents of the community that their security needs would be met without reliance on gangs.

These are all functions that local law enforcement would normally be required to undertake in situations where they are still in control of the streets and where they enjoy the trust of the local communities. In the *crime containment zones*, the police have been alienated from the community and are treated with suspicion by the residents. The police themselves treat the residents with contempt, thus the deep ill feeling between the police and the residents in vulnerable communities is mutual.³¹ The police are therefore not suitable in most cases to take the initiative to establish liaison with the communities. The military commander may therefore be more suitable to perform the important liaison responsibilities than his police counterpart.

Definition of Success

Overall success for an inner-city intervention would be contingent on concurrent activity by the civil authority and private agencies geared to revalue the depreciated physical, human, and social capital. Military success would be defined not in terms of number of gangs eliminated; gangsters arrested, charged, and sentenced for crimes; nor in terms of drug busts, firearm seizures, or gangsters killed. Neither would the aim be to transform these crime containment zones into crime free communities. Rather success would be defined by the termination of the dependence of these communities on local-based gangs for protection from aggressors and for

arbitration of interpersonal squabbles. This would be measured by the ability of the police to resume a regular, routine, policing function, along the lines of the community policing concept. It would also involve a mutually acceptable (to the police and residents) role for the citizens in the protection of the community.

Secondly, successful intervention would involve a redefinition of the role of gangs (as determined by the local communities), so that the characteristic of gangs as a unit of social bonding is maintained. The social organization that is today the gang would not have to be eliminated or displaced to another territory, but the agenda of the gang would have to be modified so the activities of the gang would no longer serve as an inhibitor of community development. Instead the internal cohesion of a local gang could help to facilitate the rebuilding of social capital.

The treatment of recalcitrant hard-core gangsters would have to be covered in rules of engagement. The basic principles of minimum force and acting within the law should be applied but not to the extent that reasonable measures for force protection are jeopardized. The use of minimum physical force may require that soldiers move and operate in numbers significant enough to discourage a potential attacker. The rules of engagement must also permit the use of lethal force to eliminate direct and immediate threats to the force and to the safety of those whom the force was charged to protect. The hard-core gangster who demonstrates primarily a criminal intent and who offers armed resistance would, be coerced into submission, prosecuted through due process, and interned in correctional institutions or warned as the case may be. At the extreme they may be eliminated as a result of legitimate application of lethal force.

The involvement of the military would of itself be an indication of the likelihood that lethal force may be needed to accomplish the security objectives. The residents should also know beforehand the extent to which the military would be prepared to go to render their

communities safe to live in. Rules of engagement must conform with the local laws to ensure protection of the human rights. They should also protect those members of the security forces exposed to the greatest danger, with the task to protect the community. Notwithstanding the above, resort to the use of lethal force would of necessity have to be small for overall success of an intervention to be assured, since it would have a direct bearing on legitimacy and the civil military relationship.

Success of the military mission would require *presence, persistence, and patience*.³²

Baldly in his commentary on the Northern Ireland situation adds the need for adherence to realities.³³ By their presence the security forces would be able to combat the reign of terror and to bring a halt to the violent confrontations which have become routine in the inner city. The very visible presence of the security forces would also preclude gangsters from employing coercive tactics to keep communities subjected. A security force, geared towards protecting a community from external aggressors, is likely to be well received by residents whose life expectancy had been threatened because of the action of armed gangs.

This would allow for more opportunities for interchanges between security force personnel and residents, as well as greater freedom of movement and freedom of action for social agencies in the communities. The achievement of the strategic objectives would therefore be furthered by close coordination and unity of effort between social agencies and the security forces. Overall success would require success with the social, economic and security objectives.

Force Multipliers

The military would bring to the domestic mission a level of credibility and trust that surpasses that of the local police. A cordial relationship as opposed to an adversarial one with the citizens of the zone to be protected would score very positive ratings and achieve much more

than any show of force could. Experienced civil affairs staff who could help to bridge the information gap between the public and the military would enhance perceptions of legitimacy and improve the effectiveness of military operations.

The ability to coordinate the activities of the social interventionists to parallel those of the security forces is another force multiplier. Success at this will prevent or at least limit the creation of void in the economic functions of the community. The protected communities should not be caused to feel that they would suffer any further economic deprivation due to inability of gangs to operate freely. Failure at coordinating the implementation of the social aspects of the intervention would hurt the legitimacy of the intervening forces and therefore make the intervention more difficult.

Transparency and accountability to the local community are also important in establishing legitimacy. The local community has to be regarded as friendly and should be made to understand the objectives of the intervention. There is likely to be some apprehension in the early stages of the intervention, but open communication will help to improve the relationship between the community and the police in the medium to long run. This relationship will be important if and when violent armed gangs begin to resist and to engage the security forces with fire.

Above all, the most important force multiplier is leadership. This is crucial because of the highly dynamic nature of the situation. Forecasts of the response of the communities could be thrown out because of a single indiscretion. If and when this occurs, the leadership on the ground must display flexibility and the ability to negotiate and compromise to resolve conflicts before they become crises. Leaders must demonstrate concern for the social problems in their zone and must be visible to the public. The leaders' example in this regard will help to establish

a favorable attitude towards the populace which will encourage troops to treat residents with respect.

Although both the civil and military hierarchy are reluctant to commit the military in a strategy to combat gangs, they cannot ignore the military mission to provide law enforcement support in cases of civil disturbances. The civil authorities may choose to take advantage of military support before the crisis explodes into a civil disturbance or it may wait for a civil disturbance to provide the trigger for the intervention of the military. In any event, the military should be prepared for an encounter with gangs in any such operations in the future. An intervention, which stands a chance at preventing or curtailing gang formation or relieving communities from the coercive influence of gangs, would serve more long-term utility than one which has as its objective the suppression of a riot. When an inner-city riot is suppressed the community just reverts to its pre-riot status quo and awaits the next explosive trigger event. When the military intervention is used to quash a civil disturbance it is being involved in a politically charged environment, in which success will be contingent as much on correct political actions, as on military professionalism.

Military participation in a security intervention into the inner city provides a feasible option for correcting the imbalance between gang and police attributes which over the past two decades have resulted in the failure of police initiatives. Military involvement is not simply a matter of supplementing policemen, although additional police personnel are likely to be required for the efficient policing of the inner city once the military has withdrawn. If the military is to make a successful intervention into failed inner-city communities, it must do better than the police at protecting its center of gravity. It must also score higher than gangs have done with the combination of legitimacy and coercion. The military brings to the table not only manpower, firepower, and materiel; but a superior expertise in the management of violence. The military

has a firm grounding in both defensive and offensive doctrines which may be adopted or modified for the urban terrain.

¹Karl Liebknecht, Militarism (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1917), 176.

²The history of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries in Britain is littered with instances of troops to quell civil disorders and the consequential souring of civil-military relations, in some cases for generations thereafter. Also, several accounts of the letting of blood of unarmed civilians at the hands of troops are reported by Mathew Midlane, "Military Aid to the Civil Authorities," Sword and Mace, ed. John Sweetman (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 108.

³Ibid., 110.

⁴Sweetman, 8.

⁵Robert Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders 1789-1878 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), 129.

⁶Ibid. The practice had allowed "US marshals and their deputies to call for troops when a district judge or justice of the Supreme Court should certify that in his opinion it was necessary."

⁷Midlane, 125.

⁸In the Los Angeles Riots the police retreated from the streets in the early stages of the disturbances. They were therefore in no position to respond, in the case of the televised beating of a truck driver Reginald Denny. This development prompted the call-out of the National Guard even before the mobilization of law enforcement units which had been earmarked for the contingency was completed. The police also abandoned their posts at two gunshops, both of which were subsequently looted. See James Delk, Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ETC Publications, 1995), 28-30, 36.

⁹Richard Shephard, "Human Rights and Counter Insurgency: Peruvian Army Officers' Perspectives," Low Intensity conflict and Law Enforcement 4, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 441.

¹⁰Midlane, 127

¹¹Barbara Dority, "Is the Extremist Right Entirely Wrong?" The Humanist, December 1995, 15.

¹²Midlane, 125.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴US Attorney General Caleb Cushing gave the following opinion in 1854: "A marshal of the United States, when opposed in the execution of his duty, by unlawful combinations, has authority to summon the entire able-bodied force of his precinct, as a posse comitatus. The authority comprehends, not just bystanders and other citizens generally, but any and all organized armed forces, whether militia of the state, soldiers, sailors, and marines of the United States." Coakley, 132.

¹⁵US Army, FM 100-19, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 3-1.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Steve Peterson, "Civil disturbances in the American Urban Environment: An Evaluation of US Army Doctrine (Pt. 2)" Low intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 2, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 165.

¹⁸Coakley, 347.

¹⁹Dick Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995): 123.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Army Field Manual, Army Code 71596, Counter Insurgency Operations, Vol. V, Sec. B, Parts 3 & 4 (London: Ministry of Defence, 1996), 3-2.

²²Ibid., 3-5.

²³Sweetman, ix.

²⁴US Army, FM 100-19, 1-4.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., 1-2.

²⁷Ibid., 1-5.

²⁸Larry Cable, "Getting Found in the Fog," in CGSC C520 Syllabus, Military Operations Other Than War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 81.

²⁹Lawrence Vale, Limits of Civil Defense (New York: St. Martens Press, 1987), 20.

³⁰Tom Baldy, The Battle for Ulster: A Study of Internal Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1952.), 96.

³¹James Delk, Fires & Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, CA : ECT Publishers, 1995), 317.

³²Cable, 84.

³³Baldy, 92.

CHAPTER 4
IMPLICATIONS OF USING MILITARY FORCE
TO COUNTER GANGS

The feasibility acceptability and suitability test has to be applied to the notion of utilizing military force as a partner in an intervention to combat violent criminal gangs and provide security for inner-city communities, before political will is exercised in favor of this concept. In making the assessment, it will be necessary to return to the subject of attitudes towards the use of military force, specifically the attitude of those that consider such an intervention to be an unsuitable mission for the military, for:

It is a fundamental tenet of democracies that public opinion should be regarded as important. . . . In a relatively open, democratic society . . . it is generally assumed that governments are at least in part responsive to the popular will and that the broad range of policies they pursue ought to enjoy public support.¹

Among the primary institutions that consider military intervention unsuitable is the military. It has been characteristic of military bureaucracies to resist change and to preserve established traditions. Even at a time when the threats to vital national security interests are acknowledged to be diverse and the when nature of potential conflict is more likely to lead to operations short of war and fighting on urban terrain, than to full-pitched battles between conventional forces, militaries have been reluctant to let go of the stigma associated with operations other than war.

Were the political authorities to depend solely on the advice of the civil police, there would also be only a slim chance that military support would be requested. Law enforcement agencies have their own opposition to military intervention. They have their mission and a

professional pride to safeguard. Only where the status of morale and professionalism have been severely battered, would such requests for military support be forthcoming from the police. The obvious exceptions being where there exist grave threats to the security of institutions of the state or the interests of capital--in essence public and private property. It is also characteristic of the police bureaucracy to resist change. Machiavelli offered an explanation for the resistance to change:

There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order . . . [because of] the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.²

Should the resistance of both the military and civil law enforcement institutions to the notion of military intervention be sufficient to attest to the unacceptability and unsuitability of the military option? This question may only be justifiably addressed in the context of the specific objections of the forces and a consideration of which interests are being served by maintaining the status quo. It is to be remembered that, in the final analysis the basic aim of security for which the institutions exist is the protection of the people--all the people and that while people in a democracy value their freedom, their democracy, they have to be alive in order to enjoy them.

Military apprehensions over operations other than war have generally to do with concerns about the detraction from military professionalism and from the primary purpose of an army, about involving troops in situations for which they are not trained, about exposing soldiers to undue danger, and about potential harm to the civil-military relations. When the concerns of the police as well as those of the wider civil society previously discussed are analyzed together, the implications of a military intervention and validity of an approach to a solution of the inner-city dilemma may become clearer. The concept of military intervention contemplated in the

inner city has already pacified some of the concerns, but others remain to be examined more fully.

Challenge to Military Professionalism

Samuel Huntington distilled the essence of the military profession. He made the distinction between an occupation and a profession stating that: "A profession is more narrowly defined, intensely and exclusively pursued, and more clearly isolated from other human activity than are most occupations."³ The particular expertise of the military profession has been recognized as the management of violence:

A distinct sphere of military competence does exist which is common to all, or almost all, officers and distinguishes them from all, or almost all, civilians. . . . The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence, is the peculiar skill of the officer.⁴

The expertise in the management of violence is particularly suited for the military security of the state--for waging war against the military forces of hostile nations. War fighting, however, is by no means the only situation in which the skill of violence management is demanded. The range of operations other than war--including peace-making, peace enforcing and peacekeeping--that has necessitated military intervention in different parts of the world, is testament to this. The military intervention during the Los Angeles riots of 1992 saw some 325,000 rounds of ammunition being issued to the almost 15,000 National Guardsmen, Army, and Marines. The ground commander stated that: "The national guard fired a total of twenty-two bullets in self-defense, killing one and injuring another⁵" and asserted further that "the military involved in the Los Angeles Riots [knew] where every bullet went and [knew] that no innocent people were injured or killed."⁶

The military's special expertise is not necessarily diminished if it is practiced to protect citizens from those groups in the domestic environment, which employ violence to further selfish

motives. Besides, "it must be remembered that the particular skill of the [profession] is the management of violence not the act of violence itself."⁷ The traditional concerns about erosion in military professionalism arising from employment on law enforcement type duties and are not without merit and cannot be dismissed as the product of irrational thinking by persons who refuse to change. The ill-effects would be expected under the following conditions: (1) where military success is not defined; (2) where military personnel were employed as supplementary to law enforcement, that is, to add the number of personnel available to task, instead of exploiting their understanding of operational art and the science of violence management; and (3) where military units are subdivided in microdetachments which cause military supervision and tactical flexibility to be undermined.

These conditions are all likely under the traditional assumptions underlying the formulation of internal security policy and doctrine for employing military forces in support of domestic law enforcement.

The experience of the Jamaican military (JDF), for example, in support of the local police on internal security operations, would cause the JDF to advance the argument that such operations do have negative effects on military professionalism. British Forces operating in Northern Ireland for over two decades would express a similar view. The Jamaican police strategy of containment was supported by the JDF. The result being that the gang threat was kept fairly well localized in specific communities. The status quo in these communities did not, however, change. Marked success in the suppression of gang activity recorded in the early stages of deployment tended to be reversed within six-to-eight weeks. The threat from dangerous gangs was therefore not effectively neutralized over the long run: residents of the affected communities continued to be fearful for their lives; those who could find alternative accommodation in other communities continued to relocate; no-go areas for none residents remained; routine policing was

still impossible; and the physical, human, and social capital of the communities was still as depleted as ever.

This stalemate required the protracted deployment of the military on what the soldiers view as a no-win situation. These operations had a heavy cost for the military: its reputation for impartiality was questioned because of a perceived hostile attitude towards a particular community that housed a dominant gang believed to be responsible for most of the aggression against a more vulnerable community. Discipline was difficult to enforce because of the lack of military supervision caused by the deployment of military personnel in half section strength (to patrol jointly with police). The retention of junior leaders became more difficult because of the stressful nature of the task, and the morale of the soldiers engaged on these operations on a prolonged basis was harmed.

The professionalism of the JDF was therefore harmed because of the pursuit of a bankrupt police strategy. These risks to the military could have been minimized by approaching the task as a military problem. Operational art when applied to the problem would identify the gangs' center of gravity and their decisive points and guide the formulation of an appropriate strategy to undermine the legitimacy of the gangs and bring about their defeat.

Notwithstanding the expressed aversion of most military men to law enforcement types of missions and their "profound reluctance to involve themselves in disputes of an essentially civil character,"⁸ there is a popular view that the military could execute both its traditional and nontraditional missions without the one jeopardizing the other.⁹ There is a particular need to be cautious about expectations of what force may achieve when working among civilians and working without a defined physical enemy. The management of violence is truly "an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training."¹⁰ There is no more proficient organization, with expertise in the management of violence than the

military. Attempts to equip train and employ special arms of the police with military type capabilities have simply not worked.¹¹ The arguments for a third force which would preclude the need to resort to military force have also fallen by the way, because of the increased capabilities afforded to the police.¹²

The military has specialists who have developed a particular expertise for applying violence under different conditions. "The variety of conditions under which violence may be employed and the different forms in which it may be applied, form the basis for sub-professional specialization."¹³ The arena of military support for civilian law enforcement in urban areas may eventually become one such subspecialization.

Any lack of military expertise in conducting operations on urban terrain may not suffice as an excuse for avoiding such operations, since urban warfare doctrine does exist.¹⁴ Existing internal security doctrine emphasizes protecting the integrity of the state and the security of public institutions and property, with little regard for the security of the local civilian population. It does bear relevance and offers guidance for any contemplated intervention by military forces in the domestic environment. Before the military could be safely called upon to perform the type of intervention which may be necessary, an explicit military doctrine for civil protection from domestic threats would have to be developed, and time allowed for the expertise to be gained in this particular application of force.

The participation of the military in domestic security operations may on the surface appear to blur the roles of the military and the police. Upon examination, however, the very contrary is observed. In the final analysis the real issue is about finding the correct mix of forces and capabilities for the task. Adding another specialist area of military competence should not detract from the military profession, instead it should reinforce the position of the military as the specialists in the management of violence. Such a military specialization would not need to

detract from the role of regular law enforcement either, since conditions which would give rise to the consideration of a military intervention would of necessity be made restricted. The failure of the local law enforcement would need to be evident; for if there is the opportunity still exists for the police to do their job, then they must do it. The doctrine should serve to preserve the military specialty as the managers of violence; enforcing the distinction from the specialty of law enforcement as the keepers of the peace and enforcers of the law.

The political directorate has the responsibility for national strategy. If the strategy is to keep inner-city communities as crime containment zones, then civil law enforcement should continue with the job. To commit the military to support such an endeavor would undermine military professionalism. On the other hand if the strategic purpose is to recapture the communities from armed gangs, then military participation in an intervention may be achieved, without prejudice to military professionalism. The intention of the authorities must be made clear.

The civil authorities makes the ultimate decision on whether or not the military instrument of power will be involved in resolving any security problem. If the decision is in the affirmative, "so long as their orders are legal, [the military] must comply."¹⁵ It is the security forces, however, that decide how to conduct operations once they become committed. The military may choose to participate in law enforcement support operations as supplementary policemen which would put its professionalism and its reputation on the line. On the other hand it may choose to participate in a manner which allows it to retain its professionalism and its supremacy as the managers of violence.

Force Protection

The strong security presence in the vulnerable communities will not mean an early elimination of *gangsterism*, for this is an integral part of the informal underground economy which operates in the inner city. The security presence would, however, cause modification in conduct. This would be a measure of self-preservation for the gangs. The British experience of intervention in Northern Ireland (NI), has taught that the mode of operations of the antagonists is modified to ensure their survival. Terrorists in NI were driven underground but not out of existence.¹⁶ But the failure of the military to achieve more decisive results there, were blamed on the lack of a politically feasible solution, which ensured that the terrorists were able to maintain a high degree of legitimacy among their sector of the population. On the more social and economic side of the balance, economic activity in the informal sector would also be modified to come more in line with what is acceptable in an orderly society.¹⁷ The implications are that there will be a requirement for the security forces to have a credible coercive response and to demonstrate perseverance in seeing the mission through and in ensuring their own safety. Military success would imply a diminished role and influence for gangs in the community. Should hard-core gangsters choose to resist by engaging the military in armed confrontations they would automatically bring about a change in their status. The level of hostility directed towards the troops may be attributed to perceived relative deprivation on the part of gangs, and their struggle to hold on to the control of the inner city. Violent gang resistance would justify an escalation in force, based on the military's undeniable right to self-defense.

The experience in the Jamaican case, where the military has been assisting the police with internal security operations, targeted at gangs in the most violence-prone, inner-city communities, is instructive. Gangs avoided contact with alert detachments of security personnel. They practiced evasion techniques instead of engaging in firefights. They would, however,

frequently open fire if surprised by security patrols, in order to buy time to make an escape.¹⁸

Whether by way of chance contacts or deliberate encounters, shootings initiated by gangs very rarely constituted effective fire.

The experiences of the California National Guardsmen in the Los Angeles (LA) Riots of 1992 provide an approximation of what a military encounter with armed gangs could represent in the American context. The National Guards (NG) intervened in this civil disturbance very early and remained for several days after the riots were over.¹⁹ The NG therefore had an opportunity during their deployment to encounter gangs, during the height of the disturbance when the gangs' agenda and that of their local communities were more likely to coincide naturally (thereby lowering the need to coerce the community to act in consort). In the post-riot scenario, gangs were encountered in a slightly more typical if not routine mode, where community support would more likely be secured through coercion. It was a testing ground for the guardsmen, since they "faced an enemy that differed greatly from what they had been taught to face in basic training. They faced gang members. Violent gang members."²⁰

Gangsters were daring and provocative, even promising to kill soldiers,²¹ but they would always backed down before it came to a test. One gangster tried to snatch an M-16 from a National Guardsman but was forced to give up the struggle when he was butt stroked into submission by another soldier who came on the scene.²² Another made an offer to purchase an M-16 from a soldier for two thousand dollars.²³ These daring incidents usually occurred with individual soldiers who were separated from the main body. In the Jamaican context it has not been uncommon for off-duty soldiers to be approached by gunmen with requests to supply ammunition, but there have not been any documented instances of soldiers on operations being approached in this way. The common trend appears to be that the soldiers were more likely to be approached when alone and considered vulnerable. There are likely to be many opportunities for

individual soldiers to become separated from the main body of troops during urban operations. The doctrine for force protection on this type of operation should take this risk into account and specify safeguards to minimize the same.

Lots of small arms fire were reported by the troops during the nights of the Los Angeles riots. There were some seventy-one reported cases of shots being fired at troops over the thirteen-day period from the start of the operation to its conclusion. One-third of the incidents were reported on the first day of deployment, at the peak of the riots.²⁴ There was seldom a requirement for the troops to return fire, although in many instances the source of the firing was not discerned and so returning fire would have been meaningless. From the accounts, however, it may be deduced that nearly all the gangs' firing was ineffective, even although there were some aimed shots and firing from automatic weapons.

This may have been a reflection of the gangsters' efforts at self-preservation in not directly taking on a superior force, as well it may be an indicator of the poor-shooting ability of the gangsters. Most gang killings are known to be done in execution style at very close range. From observation, the greater portion of shots fired by gangs appeared then to fall in the category of harassing, intimidating, or as a show of strength. "The only bullet to strike a soldier or marine in Los Angeles County was self inflicted."²⁵

James Delk, the ground commander, asserted that the "only real defense was the disciplined behavior of the troops. They had to perform as trained, wear their flak vests and helmets. There [was] no way to avoid all vulnerabilities while we had troops in the streets."²⁶ The analysis of the situation, however, indicated that the intervention strategy and tactical conduct on the ground helped in determining the level of risk exposure. Incidents related by Delk suggest that a no-nonsense approach and an aggressive posturing by the guardsmen were usually sufficient to cause provocateurs to back away.

The somewhat hostile response of the most dangerous gangs in Kingston may be directly related to the security forces' strategy targeting the gangs for elimination through a process of attrition, without first attacking their center of gravity. From the outset therefore, these gangs and security forces regarded each other as enemies, in a situation which denied the security forces the use of their traditional strengths (maneuver and firepower) and allowed the gangs to maximize their own strengths (in terms of their legitimacy and superior knowledge of the terrain). This approach had additional disadvantages since the security forces were clearly identifiable and constrained by law in what they could and could not do. Gang members on the other hand were a law unto themselves. They had identities that were obscure, moved back and forth between being ordinary citizens to be protected by the law of the land and rogues to be coerced into compliance or made to face prosecution under the law. The behavior of hard-core gangsters often mirrored that of a combatant to be engaged in battle according to the principle of self-defense, if not the law of war.

In essence it was by following the bankrupt police strategy of directly targeting the gangs before undermining their center of gravity, that caused the interventionist's weaknesses to be set against the gangs strengths. This is precisely how law enforcement has approached the problem for years. The gangs quickly perceiving an advantage on their part would be more likely to engage the security forces with fire.

The strategy employed in Los Angeles recognized the different roles for law enforcement and the military. The plan "called for law enforcement to move to an area, quell whatever disturbance was involved, arrest lawbreakers, and have the National Guard occupy the area. The Guard would secure the area, conduct patrols, and prevent the return of riotous conditions."²⁷ This mission as described still left the burden of tracking down offenders to the law enforcement agency. The military had primarily a protective security mission which projected forward of

their protected target in the form of patrols. With such a role, the military had a good opportunity for establishing legitimacy and succeeded in this regard where the police could not. Based on the results, the strategy used in Los Angeles commends itself for future application and may safely be considered feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

In Belfast and Kingston where armed groups have been directly targeted, the results in terms of limiting the influence of the groups have been minimal over the long run, and troops have been overly exposed. The analysis suggests that danger to troops tends to be aggravated as a result of bad strategy and tactical blunders which cause gangs to achieve an advantage. Military commanders would prefer scenarios where they can rely more on maneuver and firepower for a decisive victory and are likely to be ill at ease with so little direct impact on force protection. The alternative of leaving the police to treat the matter because it was too risky for combat troops is not acceptable.

Command and Control

Existing doctrine for the command and control of counterinsurgency operations may be adopted without the need for any major modification. Political direction for the operation would originate in a local committee headed by the competent local political authority. The other members of the committee would be the local police and military commanders. The purpose of the committee would be to provide the link between the civilian authorities and the security forces. The committee would not, however, be involved in the function of command.

The organizational form that would best suit the nature of the intervention would be that of a task force, with a joint police and military headquarters at the senior level of command to facilitate joint planning of all operations as well as the centralized direction of all available intelligence assets. The task force should also have senior civil representation to coordinate the

provision of social services to be provided by government or private agencies. Both the military and police would retain command posts at the tactical level and would exchange liaison officers between them.²⁸ For the sake of unity of command, the police and military heads must function as coequals with the military having the final say on matters of tactics and the police on matters of the law, where each has competence. The British doctrine suggests that a convenient location for the task force headquarters would be the local police headquarters.²⁹

Task Organization

The military's organization and training are designed to make the military ready for its war-fighting role. Where specialist skills are considered desirable, the military has organized, trained, and equipped units in those skills. The specified and implied tasks which are likely to fall to units participating in an inner-city intervention, the nature of the threat in the inner city and the limited objectives for the military participant will suggest the type of unit and form of organization most suited for such a mission. The primary military tasks previously identified in this study were: (1) the separation of hostile communities, (2) the establishment of protected zones, (3) the protection of lawful civilian authorities in zone, (4) the protection of the community from life-threatening external attacks by repelling armed gangs, (5) the provision of escort for police units and security cordons as required, (6) the conduct of show-of-force operations, (7) delineation and mapping of communities in the area of operations, (8) identification of formal and informal centers of influence in the community, (9) coordination with the identifiable leadership of communities perceived as hostile to each other as well as with the wider political and civic leadership, (10) the establishment of a system for accountability to the community of residents being protected, and (11) reassuring the residents of the community that their security needs would be met without reliance on gangs.

Military operations on urban terrain, where the resident civil population is still in place, are becoming a common feature of modern warfare as more and more of the world's population moves to live in cities and as more conflicts between different ethnic groups break out all over the globe. This is likely to continue whether or not a decision is made to intervene militarily in the environment of the inner city. Infantry units, both light and mechanized, would appear to be the best suited for employment in the inner city, since they would face the least detracting from established war-fighting roles. Infantry units are suited for their agility and flexibility. Also because "many of the combat multipliers--artillery, mortars, close air support, electronic warfare, and the speed and shock effect associated with fast-moving armored forces--are greatly reduced or entirely eliminated in cities."³⁰ The relatively static and defensive posture of the operation will reduce the need for mobility assets, making light infantry less handicapped in this environment than is usually the case in other combat scenarios. This may afford the light infantry a spectrum of operations in which it may take the lead.

There would also be a significant requirement for intelligence staffs down to company level. The experience in Northern Ireland as well as Kingston has shown this will be of the low technology, human intelligence variety. Its relevance and importance would be acutely obvious in the stage of the operation where the most dangerous gangs begin to resist their own demise. The work of the collectors and analysts would, however, be necessary from the earliest stages of the operation. Initially, the military would need to rely on the police for basic intelligence which will be critical for guiding the military into making appropriate decisions on their disposition on the ground.

For the important liaison functions not necessarily requiring the use of force, special expertise in civil affairs and public relations would be an asset. The task force would therefore either have to train its own cadre of experts or seek civil affairs personnel. The Military Police

personnel could perform the necessary liaison with local police. They would also bring other advantages to this operational environment because of their familiarity with interacting with the wider public.

The nature of the gang threat is such that local area knowledge or knowledge of the human landscape, as Larry Cable describes it, would carry a high premium and possibly be among the force multipliers if this could be attained. It would therefore be prudent to use troops who had the greatest familiarity with local conditions in the local area of operations. In the case of the US this would imply the National Guard units situated across the union. This approach could give greater relevance to the citizen soldier in his domestic environment.

The matter of personnel and personal security must also be addressed. When local troops are employed against persons (gangsters--brothers, uncles, friends) with whom they are familiar,³¹ a threat of retaliation could be raised against military dependents. At the tactical level, commanders would therefore need to balance the advantage to be gained from familiarity with the human landscape against the need for social distance between the soldiers social life and his field of combat. There will therefore be a need for regular soldiers to complement the work of citizen soldiers during the stage of active resistance from the gangs.

Training Requirements

Part of the resistance of the military to law enforcement support operations comes from the fact that military training does not focus on preparing soldiers for these tasks. Lieutenant Colonel T. R. Milton of the US Army noted that despite the existence of a body of historical urban combat experience "current training does not specifically address that experience or prepare soldiers and leaders for any of the unique challenges associated with urban combat."³²

There is already the responsibility on the shoulders of commanders to ensure soldiers know how to fight on urban terrain. Milton states in his article that they “must develop effective tactics for all levels of urban conflict and combat, test those tactics and task organizations at training centers to validate their utility and then inculcate the lessons learned in the tactical and operational body of the military.”³³ There are distinct differences between fighting conventional battles on open terrain, synchronizing all the battle operating systems to concentrate combat power on the decisive point and fighting on restrictive urban terrain. Hence the great need for urban warfare training. There are also differences between fighting an identifiable foreign enemy and securing a vulnerable citizenry from violent gangs, even when both take place on urban terrain. The training for conventional urban warfare will, however, provide the majority of the skills necessary for the later scenario. Modifications would be necessary to bring tactics in line with the concept of the operation, and the military’s role as a participant alongside other agencies in a multiagency intervention.

Mission-essential training at the individual level would be particularly important in the areas of marksmanship, collection and reporting of information, interpersonal communication, and personal security. At the squad and platoon levels, urban patrolling, urban observation posts, vehicle control points, and building security would be important. Company and battalion level training should gear to prepare for such tasks as the conduct of raids, cordons, and crowd control operations. Special junior leadership training to prepare noncommissioned officers for greater autonomy and responsibility would also be a critical requirement. The majority of these tasks are already among those on the infantry’s mission task list. What would be new is the doctrine linking these tasks to the strategic objective of securing failed inner-city communities from the internal domestic threat of armed violence.

Every forward-looking Army, in countries which experience the failed inner-city phenomenon, would be well advised to train for the sort of operations which could be encountered in the inner city. In 1996, a new US Army training facility, the Joint Readiness Training Center, was opened at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The facility is designed to replicate what a soldier might encounter operating in urban terrain. It offers realism and allows for training to be video taped for review after exercises. This training will suit the soldier and the Army well for war-fighting missions which are likely to occur on urban terrain. It may also serve to train up units preparing for a specific inner-city intervention mission.

The combat training of the military is superior to that of law enforcement officers. Police training does far less to prepare policemen for combat with gangs of platoon size and above, armed with automatic weapons and using paramilitary type tactics. It is immoral for the military to pass the responsibility for combating this armed threat to the peace officers, on the basis that the military is not trained for this type of task. Since the law enforcement support mission remains in military doctrine, it is incumbent on the military to prepare to render this support where the need is the greatest.

Impact on Civil-Military Relation

The most significant impact of military participation in an inner-city intervention is likely to occur in the area of civil-military relations. It is ironic how people in faraway lands, ripped apart by racial and ethnic strife, have come to view the troops of Western armies as peacemakers and peacekeepers, while the local population, from among whom the troops come, are being asked to accept no other image of their sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, than that of war fighters. There is in the words of Colonel Tsygankov a paradox about using the military in the manner suggested in this study: "The use of force in

order to guarantee domestic security is inherently paradoxical. The plan actually is to use force, a threat to human life, in order to protect the most fundamental and deepest of human rights—the right to life.”³⁴

In any community where military intervention was being contemplated, it would have already become abundantly clear that local law enforcement had been rendered irrelevant to the security needs of the community. At this stage in the life of the community, the residents’ cries for help may have been silenced by the coercive power of dominant gangs. The gangs themselves would have earned a measure of legitimacy from their pretense as providers and protectors. The quiescence of the local population or their apparent acquiescence towards the gangs in the communities where they operate should be placed in the context of the gangs’ (in comparison to the police) greater credible capacity to coerce the population. The silence does not mean that the communities are satisfied with the insecurity. It certainly does not mean that the residents are exercising a choice in residing there. It has already been argued that it is the absence of choice that forces the people, fixed by the circumstances—social, economic, and geographic, to live within the failed communities.

The residents of an affected community are likely to be apprehensive at the thought of a military intervention; this is because historically the military has only come to their communities when it was necessary to use force to suppress people protests. Since it is the local population that will define legitimacy and decide whether the security forces replace the gangs as the providers of security and the civil law as the arbiter between persons for the general good, considerable effort would be required to convey the intent of the operation to the local population way in advance of a deployment. It may seem alien to the military to expose the concept of the operation and the commanders intent to persons whose loyalty to the force may be an unknown quantity. The local residents must, however, be considered among those who have the greatest

need to know. It is also useful to recall that neither the residents of the community nor the gangsters living within them are considered enemies.

The decision to involve the military should come only after the idea of military participation has been sold to the local population. It should be recognized as the responsibility of the local political authorities to convince the local populace of the pureness of its intentions. Midlane advises that "great care has to be taken to avoid exciting anti-military sentiments. For soldiers in uniform, whatever their purpose, often evoke an emotional response in the public; usually of support, sometimes of antipathy."³⁵ It will be necessary to demonstrate from the outset of the operation that the objectives are not only about physical security, but also about the development of the physical, social, and human capital of the community. Therefore to reinforce this the civilian agencies which will bear the responsibility for the action in the social sphere of the operation have to be intimately involved in planning the intervention once military participation has been deemed desirable.

Notwithstanding the best intentions, using the military in predominantly civilian operations is never easy. Special care would have to be exercised to insure that the military does not become part of the problem, instead of part of the solution. Intrusion into the personal lives of residents, in particular the restriction on illegal economic activities in the informal sector, and the nuisance factor of security operations are likely to cause some dislocation in the lives of residents. To limit the chances of this happening, interaction between the military and the identifiable leadership of the community has to be established very early. The predeployment phase of the operation would need to be dedicated to establishing the contacts with the local community and spelling out *what is in it for the community*.

There will undoubtedly be less provocation and harassment of troops than what would be expected in cases of civil disturbances where the military's role is strikingly different. On the

other hand, Midlane aptly notes that "accusations of partiality may well be leveled against the forces, and however unfounded, this may affect the tenure of future civil-military relations."³⁶ It would therefore be necessary to establish with the local residents a system for reporting grievances with the conduct of the operations. The interest of legitimacy would be served by highest levels of transparency in the conduct of the operations.

It is entirely possible and in fact very likely that lethal force will come into play during the conduct of the operation. This would carry some risk of undermining the legitimacy of the intervention and the civil-military relations. The danger of losing troops at the hands of gunmen is also real and carries similar risks. However, if the military intervenes to provide security for the local population, then the number of potential antagonists is minimized and the quarters from which hostilities are likely to come significantly reduced.

Drawing from the experience of troops during the Los Angeles riots, there is a basis for some assumptions about likely reaction from residents. There were several occasions on which the soldiers were met with instant gratification: hugs, kisses, and applause from residents upon their arrival or for a job which was appreciated.³⁷ They managed to help establish a sense of justice and equity beyond what the mission of reestablishing and then maintaining law and order required. Even the residents of the projects showed gratitude to the soldiers, "many people in the projects during the two days [the soldiers] were there, commented that they were happy to see the National Guard there."³⁸ Delk speculated that the residents were aware that the guardsmen were there to keep the peace and not interfere with the drug trade, hence they were not viewed as a threat.³⁹

By performing this function the military is also likely to open opportunities for the collection of data to help meet information requirements. This is significant since it would minimize the impact of the military's disadvantage in terms of knowledge of the terrain, both

physical and human. Either one of the risk scenarios mentioned has the potential to hurt the civil-military relationship in a serious way and would serve only the interest of the most dangerous gangs, the only ones who benefit from the status quo in the failed inner city. The risks to the military may be minimized by the practice of transparency and accountability with the public and by commanders enforcing good fire discipline.

Residents should display more acceptable and supportive behavior once the coercive influences of the dominant gangs have been lifted. Residents will recognize and will expose those from their own communities and those from hostile neighborhoods, who number among the parasitic and dangerous hard-core gangsters. They know those who have abused their liberties, robbed their possessions, abused their women, and killed the innocent. It is from this group of hard-core criminal gunmen that the military is most likely to face armed opposition which may require lethal force in self-defense. Public sympathy is hardly likely to favor such persons, unless the lethal use of force were to be casually exercised.

Transition to Normal Law Enforcement Activity

Inner-city intervention would not be expected to make a significant negative impact on the readiness of the military for its primary purpose of fighting the nations wars. It is, however, nonetheless desirable to have the military returned to barracks at the earliest feasible time. The concept of the inner-city intervention does not call for large-scale force deployment since the intervention would be targeted at the level of the local community, not an entire state, nor the whole inner city at any one point in time. Further, the military's participation in inner-city intervention would be reserved for only those communities whose attributes matched the description of the failed community. The preconditions to intervention are considered present where all attempts of the civil authorities to resuscitate the development process have failed,

where the police have lost the ability to enforce the law and to conduct routine policing, and where the physical, social, and human capital has been severely depreciated. The failure of local law enforcement is evident where armed gangs have replaced the police as the primary regulator of behavior in the community. It is also indicated by police withdrawal from normal routine policing or their admission of loss of control of the streets.

The military participation should, however, be viewed as more than just an emergency response measure to be terminated as soon as a semblance of stability becomes evident. Experience has taught that the military presence is likely to quickly bring about a lull in violent gang activity, while gangsters modify their behavior in order to survive in the new operational environment. Military deployment beyond the couple weeks which suffice in the worst civil disturbance cases would be essential, since the violent response of the dangerous gangs is likely to come later rather than early in the operation. This is the reverse of the case in operations to quell civil disturbances, where the tendency would be towards the restoration of normalcy and the pre-riot status quo. The measured duration may also be necessary to convince the local population of the qualitative change in the state's attitude towards inner-city security. To leave the area of operation prematurely would be to revert to the preintervention situation of gang domination.

The timing of the military withdrawal will be greatly influenced by the status of the violent gangs. While success of the military intervention will not be measured in terms of the elimination of gangs, the coercive power and the role of the gangs in the community would have to be radically altered, and the traditional police role restored before the complete withdrawal of troops. The successful implementation of police and community initiatives, such as Neighborhood Watch, will be a key indicator of a reversal in the role of gangs. On the social side of the intervention (which will need to continue long after the military withdrawal), a key

indicator of success would be the emergence of civic leadership and new social groups among the residents. The importance of sound intelligence will again be emphasized in the decision-making process concerning the withdrawal of the military. Community activity that meets the eye, on the surface, may not be the best indicator of the true state of relations and organizational status of the gangs. The intelligence community will have to fill the gap in knowledge between the obvious and the reality.

The response of the citizens will also be a factor in the decision to withdraw the military. The anticipated dramatic turnaround in the security of the affected community is likely to lead to demands for the retention of the military. Following the riots in 1991, the residents of Los Angeles were said to be reluctant "to let go of troops after order was restored because of the positive results."⁴⁰ The situation has been similar in inner-city Kingston, where public demands have helped to influence the decision to keep troops on the streets. Were the military unnecessary at the outset or its conduct throughout the operation considered suppressive by the people, the opposite reaction would have been forthcoming. Notwithstanding the worth of a positive public opinion and the benefits of retaining the military as a popular institution, the decision on the timing of the military's withdrawal should be guided primarily by the assessments of the security forces on the ground. Public attitude especially if it were to be negative would impact heavily on the security forces assessment, but the real crux of the decision should be no different from other military operations; the achievement of the military objectives.

¹Mathew Midlane and A. Danchev, "Public Opinion, Defence and the Army," Sword & Mace, ed. John Sweetman (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 133.

²Stephen Rosen, Winning The Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 1.

³Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 67.

⁴Ibid., 11-12.

⁵James Delk, Fires & Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, CA: ECT Publishers, 1995), 328.

⁶Ibid., 331

⁷Huntington, 13.

⁸Midlane, 108.

⁹Philip Brehm and W. Gray, "Alternate Missions for the Army" (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992), 10. They declared, "we believe that America can have it both ways: we can have a strong Army befitting a superpower, and improve the nation's physical and social structure at the same time." Former US Senator Samuel Nunn speaking in support of US Military Domestic Support Operations also expressed confidence that the military could tailor its involvement in civil-military cooperative action programs without impeding its primary mission. See Samuel Nunn "Domestic Missions for the Armed Forces" (Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, February 1993), 12.

¹⁰Huntington, 13.

¹¹The fiasco of Waco, TX, in 1993 is just one of recent examples of the mismanagement of force by the civil authorities. See "Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas, February 28 to April 19, 1993" (US Department of Justice, October 1993); Dick J. Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) and Richard Lacayo, "State of Seige," Time, 8 April 1996, 24-27.

¹²Midlane, 131.

¹³Huntington, 12.

¹⁴US Army, FM 90-10-1, An Infantry Mans Guide to Urban Combat (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 23 May 1993); US Marine Corps, Operational Handbook No. 8-7, Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain, November 1980; and Army Field Manual, Army Code 71596, Operations Other Than War and Counter Insurgency Operations, Vol. V, Sec. B, Parts 1, 2, 3, & 4 (London: Ministry of Defence, 1996) .

¹⁵Midlane, 108.

¹⁶Tom Baldy, The Battle for Ulster: A Study of Internal Security (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1952), 75.

¹⁷This may involve for example a separation of those informal transactions which are acceptable from those which are not. The latter involving narcotics trading, prostitution and extortion, would not be expected to surrender lightly to a displacement of their livelihood.

¹⁸From time to time intelligence reports would indicate gang intentions to retaliate against security forces after the gangs suffered setbacks. Such actions are seldom attempted in the Jamaican context.

¹⁹Delk, 58. It is to be noted that "the historical enmity between the police and the residents in the affected area" made soldiers more desirable than supplementary lawmen provided through mutual aid from other agencies.

²⁰Ibid., 95.

²¹Ibid., 129.

²²Ibid., 64.

²³Ibid., 147.

²⁴Ibid., 352-357.

²⁵Ibid., 155.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 61.

²⁸This is in accordance with the British doctrine. See Army Field Manual, Army Code 71596, Counter Insurgency Operations, Sec. B, Parts 3 and 4, 2-2.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰T. R. Milton, "Urban Operations: Future War" Military Review 74, no. 2 (February 1994), 38.

³¹Gangs are considered endemic to many urban communities so the risk of recruiting gang members into the military is real. "Some [US National Guard] Commanders in the Los Angeles area estimate over ten percent of their units [were] current or former members of gangs." See James Delk, 44.

³²Milton, 38.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Colonel V. A. Tsygankov was the Deputy Department Chief, Main Command Directorate of the Internal Troops, Ministry of the Interior, Russian Federation. See report on proceedings of a jointly sponsored US/Russian international workshop in "Non-Traditional Operations Involving the use of Armed Forces: Russian and International Experience," trans. Robert R. Love (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, August 1995), 23.

³⁵Midlane, 108.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Delk, 133, 145-146.

³⁸Ibid., 209.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., 15.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The threat posed by armed criminal gangs which operate in the domestic environment has not been considered by national governments to be sufficient to cause the gang problem to be cast as a military problem. This is a reflection of a concept of national security which is alarmed only by external threats or internal threats that have a potential to bring down national governments. It is safe to conclude, however, that although gangs do not compete for official political positions, they exercise effective control over whole communities. In essence they have informal political control within their areas of domain and exercise this control in a manner that is anathema to liberal democracy.

National security policy must be as much concerned with protecting the citizens of the country and their way of life as it is with protecting territorial integrity and political stability. Security policy that succeeds at deterring territorial encroachment by foreign foes but fails at fostering a stable and secure domestic environment for its citizens is unsustainable over the long run. Governments have an obligation under the social contract to provide security and enforce the laws which are necessary for an orderly society. These are social goods which are beyond the capacity of the ordinary responsible individual to provide for oneself.

The areas of the highest concentration of intractable violence are found in the alienated inner city. The traditional denial of the severity of the problem had been forced to change as *gangsterism* threatened to break out of the *containment zones*, to infiltrate and claim additional territory in the suburbs. Public concern and fear of crime reflected a lowering of the level of

tolerance for criminal violence and concurrently a more favorable attitude towards the use of force to counter the threat.

Where the analysis of the internal security threat had determined that there may be a need to use force to counter an armed threat, then the civil authority must weigh all their options. The chosen option must be feasible in that it must have the capacity to achieve the objective within the legal constraints. It must be acceptable in that in it the inherent costs and risks would be safely absorbed. It must also be suitable for the given threat environment and the weight of public opinion, which will eventually pass a verdict on the option chosen.

The study found evidence that civil law enforcement agencies, which were responsible for routinely enforcing the rule of law, had failed in their mission in the inner city. Peace officers needed to be equipped, dressed, and trained to move and shoot like members of the infantry, in order to accomplish their mission--a clear indication that the police needed support. Armed and violent gangs exercised social, economic, and quasi-political control over recognizable terrain. They fostered a subculture in which civil authorities became observers, and civil law enforcement agencies were rendered irrelevant for the security needs of residents.

Internal security doctrine permitted the employment of military force to support civil law enforcement when political stability was threatened by revolt, rebellion, or insurrection by citizens. Military support is also extended in cases of extreme threats to public and private property or in other words to protect important possessions. The doctrine is, however, faulty in that it does not specifically address military support for the protection of citizens from the domestic threat of armed violence. The law seeks to protect the citizenry from the excessive use of force by governments, but the use of reasonable force by the state has always been acceptable in law.

Governments were therefore not barred from employing the *reasonable force* necessary to protect the population. Hence, posse comitatus and the principle of minimum force, notwithstanding military force, remained an option if domestic threats were grave and if political will would be bold enough to employ it. The international environment in the late 1990s welcomed the employment of military forces in situations which required a measure of force short of deadly force, but greater than that which could be provided by law enforcement agencies. These operations other than war demonstrated the versatility and utility of the military entity for the resolution of internal security dilemmas and contradicted the notion that war fighters were unsuitable for peace missions.

The security crisis was acknowledged as just one dimension of the inner-city dilemma. The entire human landscape encompassing the social, cultural, physical, and economic features would have to be traversed concurrently. Hence the recommendation for a multiagency intervention, with coordination at the various levels down the chain of command to ensure unity of effort, from the strategic to the tactical levels and among all the players.

The indiscriminate violence perpetrated by terrorists on home soil and the spread of the scourge of narcotics were identified as domestic threats that national governments were not averse to counter by assigning their militaries supporting functions to those of civil law enforcement. Criminal gangs were heavily engaged in the narcotics trade and in the use of indiscriminate violence to protect same. Since much of their activity was taking place in the inner-city areas where local law enforcement agencies had failed to preserve the rule of law, it was appropriate to consider violent gangs as a threat to security. It was concluded that the employment of the military in support of a countergang strategy would be likely to receive a favorable public response.

Although violent gangsters were the brothers, fathers, uncles, and cousins of the residents of the inner city, gangs ruled largely without consent. They derived legitimacy from their role as protectors from hostile gangs and as providers of benefits from the spin-offs of the drug trade and other crimes. Citizens also tried informal economic activity and unconventional security measures--in the absence of traditional resources--to assure their own survival. The sum of all their efforts were: more poverty, increased violence, greater alienation of the community, and the deeper entrenchment of gangs as an alternative center of power to local and by extension state authorities.

The analysis of the security threat identified the gang's center of gravity as the support of residents in the local community. The gang's decisive point was therefore identified as that which established and sustained the gang's legitimacy. This was viewed as its credible capacity to coerce as well as its perceived status as a provider and protector of the community. The gang's chief weakness lay in the fact that its status hinged heavily on its ability to coerce. A gang would reach its culmination point and be defeated when its capacity to coerce was neutralized and when it was relieved of its functions as provider and protector. The finding that this mission was beyond the scope of local law enforcement urged consideration of the military option.

Military force was considered feasible, acceptable, and suitable as a participant in a multi-agency intervention, under conditions that allowed it to retain its professional military posture. This would require a clear strategic purpose, mission, and end state. Thus, the military could effectively support law enforcement if the strategic objective was to dislodge armed gangs from their position of control and to restore the function of protection to law enforcement. Military force was not, however, suitable to support a strategic objective of containment of crimes of violence.

The military had the advantage over the police of a better appreciation for defensive doctrine which would allow it to better assume a role of protecting a local community from hostile attack. The military was also more suitable for maintaining the presence which the mission would demand. Finally, the military as the professional managers of violence were better able to withstand the resistance which would be expected from the gang once it began losing its position of dominance and control. Strong gang resistance was expected against opposition (security forces) perceived as weak.

Risks to military professionalism were weighed and found acceptable for the particular strategic objectives as suggested. Law enforcement agencies that had attempted to apply and manage the use of force were found to be counterproductive and to have harmed their own chances of resuming routine policing functions. It was suggested that utilizing citizen soldiers for an inner-city mission would improve knowledge of the human landscape, but it carried risks when there was too much familiarity between soldiers and those who were likely to offer resistance. Professional soldiers would therefore be necessary in an intervention.

Force protection was identified as a serious concern of commanders. The risk to troops of being provoked, harassed, and shot at was expected to diminish under a strategy that sought as its first order of business the security of the community. Because the strategy was not about pursuing the gangster as an enemy, it allowed room for retention of the less violent gang as a social group. By allowing a natural separation of the milder from the more violent gangsters, the corners from which hostile fire was likely should be constrained. Should deterrence fail there would be timely escalation in force to the level of lethal force.

The concern about detraction from the military's war-fighting mission could be addressed by tasking the appropriate military organization. The tasks which would be required were typical of those for infantry fighting to urban terrain; therefore, the infantry could be

suitably tasked without much harm. There would be a need, however, for the formulation of doctrine and situational awareness training. Given the high likelihood of future combat on urban terrain, infantry training was already gearing soldiers for urban operations.

There are inherent risks to the civil-military relationship whenever the military is deployed among civilians. These were considered to be less than those associated with military support to law enforcement during civil disturbances. Governments have been prepared in the past to absorb the higher risks associated with putting down riots and other civil disturbances. Therefore, given that human lives, including those domiciled in the inner city, are considered more important than human possessions (which are at the greater risk during riots), then it is reasonable to expect that the inherent risks to civil-military relations may also be absorbable for a security intervention in the inner city. To further reduce the risk of harming the relationship, a high degree of accountability and transparency was recommended. This would facilitate speedy reporting and processing of citizens' complaints that required redress.

The multiagency approach to the intervention was viewed as being better suited to the community's need for long-term human security than gangs. This should serve to limit violent resistance to just the hard-core gangsters who stood to lose from their loss of dominance. Success with the social side of the intervention should help to evoke favorable responses from the majority of residents. Civil-military relations were therefore not overly exposed.

The special situation presented by armed criminal gangs was complex, for not only did the gang phenomenon defy a single simple definition, but within the social context that this phenomenon took its shape and form, there were also submerged the factors of segregation, class, race, ethnicity, poverty, and squalor. This combination of social deprivation, perceptions of injustice, and a history of turmoil could in the future create a serious backlash if not attended

to early. The simmering crisis of human insecurity has defied many varied and innovative attempts to resolve it.

This study is by no means a complete answer for all the issues that arise in determining what to do about inner-city protection. There remains unresolved issues which need to be addressed but were beyond the scope of this paper. Specifically, there is room for study on models of citizen participation in community defense. Also deserving of inquiry is the impact on civil liberties of militarizing law enforcement units. The purpose of this study was to determine whether there may be a feasible, acceptable, and suitable role for the military in protecting the most vulnerable inner-city communities from the threat posed by armed and violent gangs. The findings suggest that such a role may be fashioned with a good opportunity for success. In respect to the specific finding, an empirical study to verify the readiness of the stakeholders for the type of intervention suggested is recommended to any keen researcher seeking a challenge.

The identification of conditions which favor military participation means that there remains an option for the civil authorities to fulfill their obligation under the social contract with society, to protect the population. The dangers of employing the military under unfavorable conditions have also been highlighted and are to be avoided. Although making the case for the justification of using military force for community protection, the intention was not to urge the involvement of the military in domestic support for law enforcement. Hence there is no such advocacy.

As is the case whenever the use of the military instrument of power is contemplated, the decision is ultimately political, and the overarching concern is with economics. The civil authorities will exercise political will, employing the sources and instruments of power at its disposal, to serve the perceived interests of the nation. The authorities need not, however, be constrained by narrow conceptions of national and internal security interests when the

instruments of power are considered in reference to inner-city security. Large countries with large populations and stable economies may be able to absorb the volatile shocks that outbreaks of intercommunal gang violence can cause. Countries with smaller populations and fragile economies may not be able to absorb such violence, nor the prospect of segregated *crime containment zones*.

Already, the issue is of more than just academic interest to small developing countries like Jamaica. Should the activity of violent gangs not be checked, the very real dangers to national security (even in the traditional sense of considering threats to internal security) may over time also come to be realized in larger countries and with more stable economies. Among the few remaining options to counter violent gangs and secure failed inner-city communities is that contained in the operational concept proposed in this study. It calls for a multiagency intervention in which an application of limited military force is involved in the security component of the problem.

Success at achieving the strategic purpose and sustaining a stable and secure domestic environment is most likely when the efforts of all the stakeholders are synchronized. The military and the police would be limited on their use of force, in recognition of the very real limitations to what force may achieve in the domestic environment before it becomes counterproductive. The observance of the principle of minimum force helps safeguard the very fundamental rights that the security aspect of the intervention is geared to protect. To ensure the application of a minimum physical force may, however, call for a show of force. The greater security presence would in itself boost the deterrence factor and should make the actual use of physical force less necessary.

The force multipliers in an intervention would clearly not be derived from superior weapon systems, although there may remain some advantages from having expert marksmen,

when it comes to confrontations with hard-core gangsters. What may be expected from the military's contribution is the fostering of a security environment conducive to the development of human and social capital. The civil authorities and the social agencies, which on their own used to be hindered in their individual efforts to make real social progress, would benefit from the greater coordination of security and social goals. If a main and supporting effort is to be determined for the intervention, the social agencies would clearly be designated the main effort with the security forces playing a very significant enabling and supporting role.

Long-term stability and security in the inner city should not depend on the military's input. Once used effectively, the military's supporting effort to the deterrence factor may remain intact while the military is still in barracks. The posturing of a military force as a deterrent force is used in international relations. In some dictatorships, military posturing has been used to deter opposition. There is room in liberal democracies for a more constructive use of the military deterrent, as has been suggested. It may seem indeed to be paradoxical that the threat of military force should serve the interest of liberty and democracy, but this is entirely feasible. Sustaining the end state once achieved would rest with the revived local leadership and their local organizations, in cooperation with the civil authorities, NGOs, and the community policemen.

On the other hand, were the military to be employed inappropriately for a crime containment strategy, there would be long-term risks to military professionalism, as a containment mission tends not to have an unattainable end state. Under such conditions returning the military to barracks becomes the more difficult political decision, for it is almost inevitable that the military would have to be recalled repeatedly. Over time the effectiveness of the military would be likely to diminish. Because of the nature of the threat, a containment strategy is not one for which military support would be feasible.

While in the modern era, deployments on operations other than war, within and without the domestic environment, have been regarded as nontraditional roles for the military; their origins have a place in history antecedent to the concept of modern warfare. What are called non-traditional missions in the modern era were the very missions which proved the worth of the military and helped to establish the tradition of selfless service in the preservation of the population and the ideals of freedom and democracy. The trend in the modern era instead of being viewed as a departure could just as well be described as a return to the basic aim of security: the protection of the people--all the people, not just the elite.

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